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Abstract
This work develops algorithmic results for the classic cake-cutting problem in which a di-
visible, heterogeneous resource (modeled as a cake) needs to be partitioned among agents with
distinct preferences. We focus on a standard formulation of cake cutting wherein each agent must
receive a contiguous piece of the cake. While multiple hardness results exist in this setup for
finding fair/efficient cake divisions, we show that, if the value densities of the agents satisfy the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), then strong algorithmic results hold for various notions
of fairness and economic efficiency.
Addressing cake-cutting instances with MLRP, first we develop an algorithm that finds cake
divisions (with connected pieces) that are envy-free, up to an arbitrary precision. The time com-
plexity of our algorithm is polynomial in the number of agents and the bit complexity of an un-
derlying Lipschitz constant. We obtain similar positive results for maximizing social (utilitarian)
and egalitarian welfare. In addition, we show that, under MLRP, the problem of maximizing Nash
social welfare admits a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
Many distribution families bear MLRP. In particular, this property holds if all the value densi-
ties belong to any one of the following families: Gaussian (with the same variance), linear, bino-
mial, Poisson, and exponential distributions. Furthermore, it is known that linear translations of
any log-concave function satisfy MLRP. Therefore, our results also hold when the value densities
of the agents are linear translations of the following (log-concave) distributions: Laplace, gamma,
beta, Subbotin, chi-square, Dirichlet, and logistic. Hence, throughMLRP, the current work obtains
novel cake-cutting algorithms for multiple distribution families.
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1 Introduction
Cake division is a quintessential model in the study of fair division. This setup captures the allo-
cation of a divisible resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with equal entitlements, but
distinct preferences. Over the past several decades, a significant body of work in mathematics, eco-
nomics, and computer science has been devoted to cake cutting; see [BT96; RW98; Pro15] for excellent
expositions and motivating applications (e.g., border negotiations and divorce settlements) of this
framework.
Some of the central solution concepts and axiomatic characterizations in the fair-division litera-
ture stem from the cake-cutting context [Mou04]. Indeed, the work of Steinhaus, Banach, and Knaster
[Ste48]—which lays the mathematical foundations of fair division—addresses cake division. The no-
tion of envy-freenesswas alsomathematically formalized in this setup [GS58; Fol67]. This well-studied
notion deems a cake division to be fair if every agent prefers the piece assigned to her over that of
any other agent, i.e., if no agent is envious of others.
Formally, the cake is modeled as the unit interval [0, 1] and the cardinal preferences of the agents
over pieces of this divisible resource are specified via valuation functions: vi(I) ∈ R+ denotes the
value that an agent i has for interval (piece) I ⊂ [0, 1]. These valuations vis are typically assumed to
be induced by value-density functions fis, i.e., vi(I) :=
∫
x∈I fi(x)dx, for each agent i and interval I .
This work focuses on a standard formulation of cake division in which every agent must receive
a contiguous piece of the cake. That is, the goal is to partition the cake [0, 1] into exactly n disjoint
intervals (connected pieces) and assign them among the n participating agents. This connectivity
requirement is naturally motivated by settings in which a contiguous part of the resource needs to be
allocated to every agent [BT96]; consider, e.g., division of land, transmission spectrum, or processing
time on amachine. Note that a partition of the cake [0, 1] into intervals I1, I2, . . . , In—wherein interval
Ii is assigned to agent i ∈ [n]—is said to be envy-free iff vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ij) (i.e., iff
∫
Ii
fi ≥
∫
Ij
fi) for all
agents i and j.
The appeal of envy-freeness is substantiated by strong existential results: under mild assump-
tions, a contiguous envy-free cake division always exists [Str80; Sim80; Su99]. While these results
are built upon interesting mathematical connections,1 they are, however, nonconstructive. In fact,
Stromquist [Str08] has shown that there does not exist a finite-time algorithm for finding envy-free
cake divisions with connected pieces; this result holds in a setupwherein the valuations are provided
through an (adversarial) oracle. In addition, the work of Deng et al. [DQS12] establishes PPAD-
hardness of finding envy-free cake divisions with contiguous pieces, under ordinal valuations.
Algorithms for envy-free cake division remain elusive even if we relinquish the contiguity re-
quirement. It was not until the work of Brams and Taylor [BT95] that a bounded-time algorithm was
obtained for noncontiguous envy-free cake division. In general, the best-known result for this prob-
lem is by Aziz and Mackenzie [AM16], who develop a hyper-exponential time algorithm for finding
envy-free divisions with noncontiguous pieces.2
In light of these algorithmic barriers, identification of computationally-tractable instances in the
cake-cutting context stands as a meaningful direction of work. The current paper addresses this con-
sideration and, in particular, identifies an encompassing property—called themonotone likelihood ratio
property—which enables the development of efficient algorithms for fair cake-cutting (with connected
pieces).
Value-density functions fi and fj are said to satisfy themonotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP)
iff, for every x ≤ y in the domain, we have fj(x)/fi(x) ≤ fj(y)/fi(y). In other words, the likelihood ratio
1For instance, the proof by Su [Su99] invokes Sperner’s lemma.
2The problem of finding an approximate envy-free division (not necessarily with connected pieces) admits a fully-
polynomial time approximation scheme [LMMS04].
1
fj(x)/fi(x) is nondecreasing in the argument x ∈ R. Intuitively, this property asserts that, in compari-
son to fi, the density fj is higher towards the right end of the domain. We note that MLRP does not
require fi and fj to be monotonic (or unimodal) by themselves.
In the cake-division context, we will say that a collection {fi}i∈[n] of value densities (of the n
agents) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property iff for each i ∈ [n − 1], the likelihood ratio
fi+1(x)/fi(x) is nondecreasing in x ∈ [0, 1]. That is, the agents are indexedwith the property that consec-
utive likelihood ratios bear MLRP. This property is transitive and, hence, in cake-division instances
with MLRP, value densities fi and fj satisfy MLRP for all i < j.
Many distribution families are also known to bear MLRP [LM+01; CB02]. In particular, this prop-
erty holds if all the value densities belong to any one of the following families: Gaussian distri-
butions (with the same variance but different means), Poisson distributions, binomial distributions,
and single-parameter exponentials; see Appendix C for details. Furthermore, it is known that lin-
ear translations of any log-concave function satisfy MLRP [SW14]. In particular, linear translations
of the following (log-concave) distributions also satisfy this property: Laplace, uniform, multivariate
Gaussian, gamma, beta, Subbotin, chi-square, Dirichlet, and logistic. Hence, the current work obtains
novel results for many distribution families in a unified manner.
MLRP is a common assumption on agents’ utilities and type distributions in many economic
contexts; see [Jew91] for a survey. As a stylized application of MLRP in cake division, consider a
setting wherein each agent i has a most preferred point µi on the divisible resource (cake) and i’s
valuation density decreases as a Gaussian function (with a variance parameter that is common across
the agents) of the distance from µi. Indeed, the distance here can be geographical (as in case of land
division), temporal (i.e., wait time), or it can be an abstract metric.
Considering similar single-peaked preferences, but with a linear drop in value densities, Wang
and Wu [WW19] developed an efficient algorithm for noncontiguous cake division. Note that while
linear densities bear MLRP, this property does not hold for piecewise linear densities. Hence our re-
sults do not directly address the setting considered in [WW19]. However, in absence of the contiguity
requirement (as is the case in [WW19]) one can find a fair cake division by first partitioning the cake
into intervals, in each of which the agents’ value densities are linear, and then applying the MLRP
result separately.3
We focus on cake-division instances with MLRP and develop algorithmic results for almost all
the standard notions of fairness and economic efficiency. Our algorithms only require oracle access
to the valuations. In particular, the developed algorithms operate under the standard Robertson-
Webb model [RW98], wherein we have access to the agents’ valuations through eval and cut queries;
see Section 2 for details. MLRP implies that these cut and eval queries (functions) are λ-Lipschitz
(Appendix A.3).
The time complexities of our algorithms depend polynomially on the the bit complexity of this
Lipschitz constant λ ≥ 1. Such a runtime dependency on log λ is unavoidable (Appendix D): there
exist cake-division instances (with λ-Lipschitz cut and eval queries) wherein for all the agents the
value of the cake is almost entirely concentrated in an interval L of length 1/λ. Here, an envy-free
cake division can be obtained only by finely partitioning L among the agents. In particular, the cut
points that induce an envy-free allocation (and, hence, correspond to the output of a fair-division
algorithm) must be 1/λ close to each other, i.e., the bit complexity of the output has to be Ω (log λ).
In fact, one can construct instances in which a contiguous envy-free division can be obtained only by
cutting the cake at irrational points (Appendix D). Hence, in general, (and even under MLRP) one
cannot expect an efficient algorithm that outputs an exact envy-free division, with contiguous pieces.4
Therefore, when considering efficient algorithms for cake division, a precision loss in the output is
3Recall that, in contrast to such a result, our focus is on finding cake divisions in which each agent receives a contiguous
piece of the cake.
4Indeed, the bit complexity of a computationally-bounded algorithm is bounded as well.
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inevitable. However, our algorithms ensure that this precision loss in value, η, is arbitrarily small;
specifically, the developed algorithms run in time O
(
poly
(
n, log λ, log 1η
))
and, hence, the precision
parameter η can be driven exponentially close to zero in polynomial (in the bit complexity of η) time.
Note that this bit-precision issue is akin to the one faced in the convex-optimization problems (where
again the optimal solutions can be irrational) and our runtime bound, with respect to the precision
parameter η, is analogous to the one obtained by the ellipsoid method [GLS12].
Our Results and Techniques: Next, we summarize our results for various notions of fairness and
(economic) efficiency.
Envy-Freeness: We prove that, given a cake-division instance (in the Robertson-Webb query model)
with MLRP, an envy-free allocation can be computed, up to an arbitrary precision, in time that is
polynomial in the number of agents and log λ; here λ is the Lipschitz constant of the Robertson-Webb
(cut and eval) queries.
To establish this result, we define a class of divisions, referred to as ripple divisions (Definition 1),
and prove that, under MLRP, every ripple division induces a contiguous envy-free cake division
(Theorem 6). Specifically, a collection of points x0 = 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ xn−1 ≤ xn = 1 (in the cake
[0, 1]) is said to form a ripple division of the cake if, for each i ∈ [n− 1], agent i is indifferent between
the consecutive intervals [xi−1, xi] and [xi, xi+1], i.e., vi(xi−1, xi) = vi(xi, xi+1). Note that a ripple
division induces a contiguous cake division—by assigning interval [xi−1, xi] to agent i—with the
property that agent i does not envy agent i + 1. That is, in and of itself, a ripple division mandates
absence of envy only between consecutive agents, and not between all pairs of agents. We will show
that, interestingly, underMLRP this relaxation suffices–the cake division induced by a ripple division
is guaranteed to be envy free (Theorem 6). Recall that the agents are indexed following the MLRP
order: for each i ∈ [n− 1], the likelihood ratio fi+1/fi is nondecreasing. Hence, allocating [xi−1, xi] to
agent i ∈ [n] ensures that the intervals are assigned (left to right on the cake) in accordance with the
MLRP order.
We establish the universal existence of ripple divisions through the intermediate value theorem,
i.e., a one-dimensional fixed-point argument (Lemma 3). Since one can use binary search to find
fixed points in the one-dimensional setting, this proof in fact leads to an algorithm for finding ripple
divisions and, hence, envy-free divisions. Indeed, the notion of ripple divisions and their connection
with envy-freeness, under MLRP, are two key contributions of this work.
Pareto Optimality: We show that in cake-division instances with MLRP, Pareto optimal cake divisions,
with connected pieces, conform to the MLRP order (Lemma 5). This structural result implies that
for maximizing welfare we can restrict attention to allocations wherein the intervals are assigned
(left to right on the cake) in accordance with the MLRP order. Intuitively, this leads us to a welfare-
maximizing algorithm—specifically, a dynamic program—that recursively finds optimal allocations
for intervals placed at the left end of the cake (i.e., for intervals of the form [0, x]).
We also establish an extension ofWeller’s theorem in theMLRP context. Weller’s theorem [Wel85]
asserts that there always exists some cake division—though, not necessarily with connected pieces—
which is both envy-free (fair) and Pareto optimal. While this theorem holds in general,5 it does not
guarantee that envy-freeness and Pareto optimality can be achieved together through contiguous
cake divisions. We show that, by contrast, under MLRP every contiguous envy-free division is Pareto
optimal (Theorem 2). Therefore, given a cake-division instance with MLRP, the allocation computed
by our algorithm is not only envy-free but also Pareto optimal, up to an arbitrary precision.
5Weller’s theorem applies even in the absence of MLRP.
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Social Welfare: Social (utilitarian/Benthamite) welfare is a standard measure of collective value. For a
cake division {I1, I2, . . . , In} it is defined to be the sumof the values that the division generates among
the agents,
∑
i vi(Ii). Maximizing social welfare is a well-studied objective in resource-allocation con-
texts. In the cake-cutting setup, this maximization problem is known to be APX-hard under general
valuations [ABKR19]. Complementarily, if the value densities bear MLRP, then we can find (up to an
arbitrary precision) a social welfare maximizing division with connected pieces in O (poly (n, log λ))
time (Theorem 3). As mentioned previously, our algorithm for this problem is based on a dynamic
program.
Egalitarian Welfare: The egalitarian (Rawlsian) welfare of a cake division {I1, . . . , In} is defined as the
value of the least well-off agent, i.e.,mini vi(Ii). From a welfarist perspective, maximizing this mini-
mum value among cake divisions with connected pieces is an important fairness objective. However,
no nontrivial approximation guarantees are known for this problem under general valuations; the
work of Aumann et al. [ADH13] shows that maximizing egalitarian welfare across all contiguous
cake divisions is APX-hard. Complementing this hardness result, we develop an algorithm that, un-
der MLRP, maximizes egalitarian welfare (up to an arbitrary precision) and runs inO (poly (n, log λ))
time (Theorem 4).
Our algorithm for maximizing egalitarian welfare is based on a “moving-knife” procedure. This
procedure, for a given a target value τ > 0, iteratively selects points x0 = 0, x1, x2, . . . , xn ≤ 1 such
that the each interval [xi−1, xi] is of value τ to agent i ∈ [n]. Let τ∗ denote the optimal egalitarian
welfare in the given cake-division instance. The useful observation here is that this moving-knife
procedure will succeed for all τ ≤ τ∗. This follows from the fact that here the intervals are assigned
(left to right) in the MLRP order6 and this ordering is also satisfied by an egalitarian welfare maxi-
mizing (in particular, a Pareto optimal) division. Therefore, by performing a binary search with τ , we
can find a contiguous division with egalitarian welfare arbitrarily close to the optimal.
Nash Social Welfare: A balance between social and egalitarian welfare is obtained by considering the
Nash social welfare [NJ50; KN79]. This welfare objective is defined as the geometric mean of the
agents’ values. It is known that, in general, it is APX-hard to find a contiguous cake division that
maximizes Nash social welfare [ABKR19]. Under MLRP, however, the problem of maximizing Nash
social welfare admits a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (Theorem 5). We obtain this
result via a dynamic program that considers the agents in the MLRP order.
Additional Related Work: Recently, approximation algorithms—with both additive [HGS19] and
multiplicative [ABKR19] approximation guarantees—have been developed for finding contiguous
envy-free cake divisions. In contrast to these results, the current work focuses on cake-division in-
stances with MLRP and shows that in such settings arbitrarily low envy can be achieved among the
agents.
The work of Bei et al. [BCH+12] also studies contiguous cake division and provides compu-
tational results for maximizing social welfare subject to proportional fairness. Under this fairness
constraint each agent i ∈ [n]must receive an interval of value at least 1/n times i’s total value for the
cake. Bei et al. [BCH+12] show that, if the value densities are linear, then this problem admits a fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS). We note that every pair of linear densities bear
MLRP and, hence, such value-density functions fall within the purview of the current work. How-
ever, our algorithm is incomparable to the FPTAS of Bei et al. [BCH+12]–we focus on maximizing
social welfare without the fairness constraints. Also, envy-freeness is not addressed in [BCH+12].
Anotherwell-studied fairness notion is that of equitability. Specifically, a cake division {I1, I2, . . . , In}
6Note that the agents are indexed accordingly.
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is said to be equitable iff all the agents derive the same value from the intervals assigned to them,
vi(Ii) = vj(Ij) for all i and j [DS61; Alo87]. In other words, equitability ensures that all the agents
are equally well-off. Cechla´rova´ and Pilla´rova´ [CP12] consider the computation of equitable cake
divisions with connected pieces. They showed that—given access to “reverse” cutting queries—such
divisions can be efficiently computed, up to an arbitrary precision. We note that value densities
that satisfy MLRP have, by definition, full support over the cake. In such a case, the reverse cut-
ting queries can be simulated by standard (cut) queries in the Robertson-Webbmodel. Hence, under
MLRP, strong algorithmic results hold for equitability as well.
Cake-division algorithms for specific classes of valuations have been studied in [CLPP11] and
[KLP13]. The work of Kurokawa et al. [KLP13] provides a query-efficient algorithm for envy-free,
noncontiguous cake division under piecewise linear densities. Cohler et al. [CLPP11] also address
the noncontiguous version of the problem, and for piecewise constant densities they develop a
polynomial-time algorithm that computes an envy-free division with optimal social welfare. In con-
trast to these results our focus is on contiguous cake division.
2 Notation and Preliminaries
This work studies the problem of dividing a cake [0, 1] among n agents. Throughout, wewill focus on
awell-studied formulation of cake cutting which requires that each agent should receive a contiguous
piece of the cake, i.e., the goal is to partition the cake [0, 1] into n pairwise disjoint intervals and assign
them among the n agents in a fair/efficient manner.
The cardinal preferences of each agent i ∈ [n] is induced by a value-density function fi : [0, 1] 7→
R+. Following standard conventions, we will assume that each value-density function fi is (Rie-
mann) integrable. In particular, the (finite) integral of fi induces agent i’s valuation function over the
intervals contained in [0, 1] (i.e., over the pieces of the cake): vi(I) :=
∫ r
ℓ fi(x) dx denotes the value
that agent i ∈ [n] has for any interval I = [ℓ, r] ⊂ [0, 1]. For notational convenience, we will write
vi(a, b) to denote agent i’s value for interval [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1].
The integrability7 and nonnegativity of value-densities fi imply that the corresponding valuations
vi are (i) nonnegative, (ii) divisible: for every interval [ℓ, r] and parameter κ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a
z ∈ [ℓ, r]with the property that vi(ℓ, z) = κ vi(ℓ, r),
8 and (iii) sigma additive: vi(I ∪J) = vi(I)+ vi(J),
for all disjoint intervals I, J ⊂ [0, 1]. The divisibility property ensures that the valuations are non-
atomic, i.e., vi([x, x]) = 0 for all i ∈ [n] and x ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, this property allows us, as a
convention, to regard two intervals to be disjoint even if they intersect exactly at an endpoint.
We additionally assume that the valuations are normalized such that the value of the entire cake
is equal to one for every agent i ∈ [n], i.e.,
∫ 1
0 fi(x)dx = vi(0, 1) = 1. Hence, the value-densities fis
constitute probability density functions over the cake [0, 1]. We note that this is a standard assump-
tion in the cake-cutting framework and we conform to it for the purpose of brevity. All of our results
hold true, even otherwise.
Problem Instances: A cake-division instance C is a tuple 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 where [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} de-
notes the set of n ∈ Z+ agents and fis denote the value-density functions of the agents.
Robertson-WebbQueryModel: While, for exposition, we specify fis as part of the problem instance,
our algorithms only require oracle access to the valuations. In particular, the developed algorithms
7Our results hold for integrable value densities and do not necessarily require fis to be continuous. Recall that, by defi-
nition, Riemann integrable functions are bounded. Also, every (bounded) continuous function on an (bounded) interval is
Riemann integrable, but the converse is not true.
8This implication can be obtained by applying the intermediate value theorem to the antiderivative of fi.
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operate under the Robertson-Webbmodel [RW98], which supports oracle access to agents’ valuations
in the form of eval and cut queries:
(i) Eval queries: for each agent i ∈ [n], we have (blackbox) access to function Evali : [0, 1]× [0, 1] 7→ R+,
which when queried with any interval [ℓ, r] returns (in unit time) the value that agent i has for this
interval, i.e., Evali(ℓ, r) = vi(ℓ, r).
(ii) Cut queries: for each agent i ∈ [n], we can also query function Cuti : [0, 1] × R+ → [0, 1], which
given an initial point ℓ ∈ [0, 1] and a target value τ ∈ R+, returns Cuti(ℓ, τ) = y where y ∈ [0, 1] is the
leftmost point with the property that vi(ℓ, y) = τ . If for a given ℓ ∈ [0, 1] and τ ∈ R+, there does not
exist a y ∈ [ℓ, 1] such that vi(ℓ, y) = τ , then we have, by convention, Cuti(ℓ, τ) = 1.
Allocations and Cake Divisions: As mentioned previously, the goal is to assign each agent a single
interval. Towards this end, for any cake-division instance with n agents, we define an allocation to be
a collection of n pairwise-disjoint intervals, I = {I1, I2, . . . , In}, where interval Ii is assigned to agent
i ∈ [n] and ∪i∈[n] Ii = [0, 1]. Note that here the subscript of each interval identifies unique agent who
has been assigned this interval. In addition, we will refer to a collection of pairwise-disjoint intervals
J = {J1, J2, . . . , Jn} as a partial allocation if they do not cover the entire cake, ∪
n
i=1Ji ( [0, 1].
For an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In}, the endpoints of the constituent intervals will be referred to as
the cut points of I , i.e., if Ii = [xi−1, xi] for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then the cut-points are {x0 = 0, x1, . . . , xn = 1}.
We will throughout use the term allocation to specifically refer to partitions of the cake in which
each agent receives a connected piece, i.e., receives exactly one interval. More generally, a cake divi-
sion will be used to denote partitions of the cake D = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn} in which agent i receives Di,
a finite collection of intervals. Here, the bundles Dis are pairwise disjoint and their union covers the
entire cake [0, 1].
In this work we develop algorithmic results for the following notions of fairness and economic effi-
ciency.
Envy-Freeness: For a cake-division instance C, an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} is said to be envy-free iif
each agent prefers its own interval over that of any other agent, vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ij) for all agents i, j ∈ [n].
Pareto Optimality: Given a cake-division instance C, a division D = {D1, . . . ,Dn} is said to Pareto
dominate another division C = {C1, . . . , Cn} iff vi(Di) ≥ vi(Ci) for all agents i ∈ [n] and, there exists at
least one agent k ∈ [n] such that vk(Dk) > vk(Ck). Consequently, a cake division is said to be Pareto
optimal iff it is not Pareto dominated by any other division.
Recall that a cake division refers to a partition of the cake in which agent receives a finite collec-
tion of intervals. By contrast, in an allocation each agent receives a single interval. The algorithms
developed in this work compute allocations. Interestingly, though, the Pareto optimality guarantees
achieved by our algorithms are stronger in the sense that optimality holds across all cake divisions;
specifically, under MLRP, we establish that particular allocations are Pareto optimal not only among
the set of all allocations but also among all cake divisions.
Social Welfare: Social welfare is a standard measure of collective value. Specifically, social welfare for
an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} is defined to be sum of the agents’ valuations, SW(I) :=
∑n
i=1 vi(Ii).
Egalitarian (Rawlsian) Welfare: For an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In}, the egalitarian welfare is defined
as the minimum value achieved across the agents, EW(I) := mini∈[n] vi(Ii).
Nash Social Welfare: For an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In}, the Nash social welfare is defined to be the
geometric mean of the agents’ valuations, NSW(I) :=
(∏n
i=1 vi(Ii)
)1/n
.
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Finding allocations that maximize the above-mentioned welfare notions is known to be APX-
hard, in general; see, e.g., [ADH13; ABKR19]. Complementing these negative results, a key contri-
bution of this work is to identify a broad class of cake-division instances that admit strong algorith-
mic results for these welfare objectives and envy-freeness. Specifically, we focus on value densities
(distributions) that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). We will next define this
property and note that our results hold for multiple distribution families that satisfy MLRP.
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property: Probability density functions fi and fj are said to satisfy the
monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) iff, for every x ≤ y in the domain, we have fj(x)/fi(x) ≤
fj(y)/fi(y). That is, the likelihood ratio fj(x)/fi(x) is non-decreasing in the argument x ∈ R.
Note that MLRP does not require fi and fj to be monotonic (or unimodal) by themselves. We
also observe that MLRP is transitive: if two pairs of distributions {fi, fj} and {fj , fk} satisfy MLRP
separately, then the pair {fi, fk} also conforms toMLRP. Furthermore, this property continues to hold
under positive scaling: if fi and fj satisfy MLRP, then so do γifi and γjfj , for any positive scalars
γi, γj ∈ R+. This fact, in particular, allows us to restrict MLRP densities (which are typically defined
over the real line) to the cake [0, 1] and, at the same time, assume normalization
∫ 1
0 fi = 1.
In the cake-division context, wewill say that a given collection {fi}i∈[n] of value-density functions
satisfies themonotone likelihood ratio property iff there exists an order π : [n]→ [n], among the fis, such
that, for all i ∈ [n − 1], the consecutive likelihood ratios
fpi(i+1) (x)
fpi(i) (x)
are non-decreasing in x ∈ [0, 1].
That is, for each i ∈ [n− 1], the densities fπ(i) and fπ(i+1) bear MLRP over [0, 1].
We will refer to this order π as theMLRP order of the value densities. Lemma 9 (in Appendix A.2)
shows that, given a cake-division instance in the Robertson-Webb querymodel, with the promise that
the underlying value densities satisfy MLRP (i.e., given a promise problem), one can efficiently find
the MLRP order π. Hence, without loss of generality, we will throughout assume that the n agents
are indexed such that π is the identity permutation, i.e., for all i ∈ [n − 1], the likelihood ratio fi+1(x)fi(x)
is non-decreasing in x ∈ [0, 1].
It is relevant to note that, to be well defined, MLRP requires the value densities fis to be strictly
positive over the cake [0, 1]. Hence, for cake-division instances 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 with MLRP, we have
fi(x) > 0 for all i ∈ [n] and x ∈ [0, 1].
Instantiations of MLRP: MLRP induces a total order on linear value densities fi(x) = aix + bi;
see Appendix C for details. Hence, our results imply that if, in a cake-division instance, the value
densities of all the agents are linear, then an envy-free (or welfare-maximizing) allocation can be
computed efficiently.
Many other distribution families are also known to bear MLRP, e.g., Gaussian distributions (with
the same variance), Poisson distributions, and single-parameter exponentials. Therefore, our algo-
rithmic results address, in particular, cake-division instances wherein all the agents have Gaussian
value densities with the same variance, but different means.
In fact, it is known that linear translations of any log-concave function g—i.e., densities of the
form fθ(x) := g(x − θ), for θ ∈ R—satisfy MLRP [SW14]. Hence, our results also hold for linear
translations of the following (log-concave) distributions: Laplace, uniform, multivariate Gaussian,
gamma, beta, Subbotin, chi-square, Dirichlet, and logistic.
These instantiations substantiate the applicability of our algorithmic resultswhich, throughMLRP,
address a wide range of cake-division instances.
Lipschitz Constant of Cut and Eval Queries: We say that the cut and eval queries in a cake-division
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instance are λ-Lipschitz iff the following inequalities hold for each agent i ∈ [n]:
|Evali(ℓ
′, r′)− Evali(ℓ, r)| ≤ λ ‖(ℓ′, r′)− (ℓ, r)‖∞ for all (ℓ′, r′), (ℓ, r) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1]
|Cuti(ℓ
′, τ ′)− Cuti(ℓ, τ)| ≤ λ ‖(ℓ′, τ ′)− (ℓ, τ)‖∞ for all (ℓ′, τ ′), (ℓ, τ) ∈ [0, 1] ×R+
Auseful consequence ofMLRP (and the integrability of the value densities) is that the correspond-
ing cut and eval queries are in fact λ-Lipschitz, for a finite λ ≥ 1;9 see Proposition 3. This proposition
follows from the fact that (Riemann) integrable value densities fis are, by definition, bounded. Fur-
thermore, as mentioned previously, MLRP mandates that the value densities are strictly positive
over the cake. Therefore, for each agent i ∈ [n] and x ∈ [0, 1] we have 0 < L ≤ fi(x) ≤ U for some
L,U ∈ R+. Proposition 3 asserts that the Lipschitz constant λ can be expressed in terms of these
bounding parameters, λ ≤ max{1/L,U,U/L}.
It is worth pointing out that besides MLRP (and, hence, the positivity of the value densities), all
the other assumptions made in this work are standard.
The time complexities of our algorithms depend polynomially on the the bit complexity of the
Lipschitz constant λ ≥ 1.10 Asmentioned previously, in general, such a runtime dependency on log λ
is unavoidable; Appendix D provides an illustrative examples. Furthermore, it is possible—even
with rational and MLRP value densities—that the exact envy-free/welfare-maximizing allocations
are induced by irrational cuts (Appendix D). That is, in general, one cannot expect an efficient algo-
rithm that outputs an exact envy-free (or welfare-maximizing) allocation. Therefore, when consid-
ering efficient algorithms for cake division, a precision loss is inevitable. However, our algorithms
ensure that this loss is arbitrarily small. Specifically, given a cake-division instance C in which the
value densities satisfy MLRP, we can find, in time that is polynomial in log(1/η) (along with n and
log λ), an envy-free allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} such that, vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ij) − η for all agents i, j ∈ [n].
Since the precision parameter η can be driven exponentially close to zero in polynomial (in the bit
complexity of η) time, we will say that an envy-free allocation can be computed up to an arbitrary
precision.
Similarly, in the context ofmaximizing welfare (social or egalitarian) welfare, given a cake-division
instancewherein the value densities bearMLRP,we can find—in time that is polynomial in log(1/η)—
an allocation with the (social or egalitarian) welfare η (additively) close to the optimal. Hence, as in
the case of envy-freeness, we assert that a welfare-maximizing allocation can be computed efficiently,
up to an arbitrary precision.
3 Main Results
This section presents the statements of our key results.
Envy-Freeness: In Section 5 we prove that for cake-division instances, in which the value densities
satisfy MLRP, the problem of finding an envy-free allocation essentially admits a polynomial-time
algorithm.
Theorem 1. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an envy-free allocation of
C can be computed (up to an arbitrary precision) in O (poly(n, log λ)) time; here λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz
constant of the cut and eval queries.
9If a function is λ′-Lipschitz then, it is λ-Lipschitz as well, for all λ ≥ λ′.
10In the case of linear value densities, fi(x) = aix + bi, the bit complexity of the Lipschitz constant λ is proportional to
the bit complexity of the coefficients ais and bis (Proposition 3). Hence, if linear densities are explicitly given as input, then
we have a polynomial (in the input size) runtime bound.
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Recall that, under MLRP, the cut and eval queries are necessarily λ-Lipschitz (Proposition 3).
Pareto Optimality: Weller’s theorem [Wel85] asserts that there always exists some cake division
(though, not necessarily with connected pieces) which is both envy-free and Pareto optimal (among
all cake divisions, with or without connected pieces). We show that, in the context of MLRP, every
envy-free allocation is in fact Pareto optimal (among all cake divisions). Therefore, for cake-division
instances with MLRP, the allocation computed by our algorithm is not only envy-free (fair) but also
Pareto optimal, up to an arbitrary precision.
Theorem 2. Let C be a cake-division instance wherein the value-density functions satisfy the monotone like-
lihood ratio property. Then, every envy-free allocation in C is also Pareto optimal (over the set of all cake
divisions).
Social Welfare: In Section 7 we show that, up to an arbitrary precision, a social welfare maximizing
allocation can be computed efficiency under MLRP.
Theorem 3. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an allocation that achieves
the optimal social welfare in C can be computed (up to an arbitrary precision) in O (poly(n, log λ)) time; here
λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz constant of the cut and eval queries.
Egalitarian Welfare: Section 8 addresses the problem of maximizing egalitarian welfare. Specifically,
we prove that, in cake-division instanceswithMLRP, an allocation with egalitarian welfare arbitrarily
close to the optimal can be computed efficiently.
Theorem 4. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an allocation that achieves
the optimal egalitarian welfare in C can be computed (up to an arbitrary precision) in O (poly(n, log λ)) time;
here λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz constant of the cut and eval queries.
Nash Social Welfare: In Section 9 we show that, under MLRP, the problem of maximizing Nash
social welfare admits a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
Theorem 5. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an allocation with Nash
social welfare at least (1 − ε) times the optimal (Nash social welfare) in C can be computed in time that is
polynomial in 1/ε, log λ, and n; here λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz constant of the cut and eval queries.
4 Characterizations of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property
This section provides useful characterizations of MLRP (Lemma 1). This result will be used in subse-
quent sections towards the analysis of our algorithms.
Lemma 1. Let fi and fj be two value-density functions. Then, the following properties are equivalent
(i) The likelihood ratios satisfy
fj(b)
fi(b)
≤
fj(c)
fi(c)
for all 0 ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1.
(ii) The values of the intervals satisfy
b∫
a
fj
b∫
a
fi
≤
d∫
c
fj
d∫
c
fi
for all [a, b], [c, d] ⊆ [0, 1] with b ≤ c.
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(iii) The (normalized) values satisfy
b∫
x
fi
b∫
a
fi
≤
b∫
x
fj
b∫
a
fj
for all intervals [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] and all x ∈ [a, b].
That is, the value densities fi and fj bear MLRP iff they satisfy property (ii) or (iii).
Here, if the likelihood ratio
fj(x)
fi(x)
is strictly increasing, then we have a strict inequality in the
corresponding characterizations.
The proof of this lemma is delegated to Appendix A.1. Note that, in terms of the agents’ valua-
tions vi and vj , property (ii) in Lemma 1 can be expressed as
vj(a,b)
vi(a,b)
≤
vj(c,d)
vi(c,d)
for all [a, b], [c, d] ⊆ [0, 1]
with b ≤ c. Similarly, property (iii) corresponds to vi(x,b)vi(a,b) ≤
vj(x,b)
vj(a,b)
for all [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] and all x ∈ [a, b].
It is well-known thatMLRP implies first-order stochastic dominance (see Lemma 8). Interestingly,
property (iii) provides a strengthening in terms of the following characterization: over any interval
[a, b], the normalized (by vj(a, b)) values of agent j stochastically dominate the normalized (by vi(a, b))
values of agent i.
5 Envy-Freeness
In this section we develop an efficient algorithm for finding envy-free allocations in cake division
instances with MLRP (Theorem 1). Towards this goal, we define a class of cake divisions, referred
to as ripple divisions (Definition 1), and prove that, under MLRP, every ripple division induces an
envy-free allocation (Theorem 6). Existential and computational guarantees for ripple divisions are
established in Section 5.1 (Lemma 3) and Section 5.2 (Lemma 4), respectively. Section 5.4 builds upon
these results to prove our main result (Theorem 1) for envy-freeness.
We establish the universal existence of ripple divisions through the intermediate value theorem,
i.e., a one-dimensional fixed-point argument (Lemma 3). Consequentially, for cake-division instances
with MLRP, we develop an alternate proof of existence of envy-free allocations. Since one can use bi-
nary search to find fixed points in the one-dimensional setting, this proof in fact leads to an algorithm
for finding ripple divisions and, hence, envy-free divisions.
Definition 1 (Ripple Division). Given a cake-division instance C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉, a collection of points x
∗
0 =
0 ≤ x∗1 ≤ · · · ≤ x
∗
n−1 ≤ x
∗
n = 1 is said to form a ripple division of the cake iff
vi(x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ) = vi(x
∗
i , x
∗
i+1) > 0 for all agents i ∈ [n− 1].
For establishing existence of ripple divisions, we first consider a relaxation of Definition 1 wherein
do not enforce the last cut point (i.e., x∗n) to be equal to one. Under this relaxation, the intervals
{[xi−1, xi]}ni=1 do not cover the entire interval [0, 1] (instead, they span [0, xn]) and, hence, lead to a
partial allocation of the cake.
Also, by convention, the agents are indexed following the MLRP order: for each i ∈ [n − 1], the
likelihood ratio fi+1/fi is nondecreasing. Hence, assigning interval [xi−1, xi] to agent i ∈ [n] provides
an allocation wherein the intervals are assigned (left to right on the cake) in accordance with the
MLRP order. We will show that the (partial) allocation obtained by assigning interval [xi−1, xi] to
agent i ∈ [n] is envy-free (Theorem 6).
Definition 2 (δ-Ripple Division). Given a cake-division instance C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉, a collection of points
x0 = 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn−1 ≤ xn ≤ 1 is said to form a δ-ripple division of the cake iff xn ≥ 1− δ and
vi(xi−1, xi) = vi(xi, xi+1) > 0 for all agents i ∈ [n− 1].
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Both Definitions 1 and 2 require that, for all i ∈ [n−1], agent i’s value for the ith interval ([x∗i−1, x
∗
i ]
and [xi−1, xi], respectively) is positive. Also, note that a 0-ripple division is an exact ripple division.
To compose the value equalities that define a δ-ripple division (Definition 2), we consider (n− 1)
functions RDi : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. In particular, focusing on the equalities considered in
Definition 2 (i.e., vi(xi−1, xi) = vi(xi, xi+1)), we note that that if we set the first cut point x1 = x ∈
[0, 1], then all the subsequent points x2, . . . , xn ∈ [0, 1] are fixed as well. In particular, x2 is the point
that satisfies v1(0, x) = v1(x, x2) and, iteratively, xi+1 can be identified from vi(xi−1, xi) = vi(xi, xi+1).
The functions RDis capture this “ripple” effect and can be expressed as compositions of cut and eval
queries. Formally, the functions RDi : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], for i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, are recursively defined as
follows11
RD2(x) := Cut1 (x,Eval1(0, x))
RDi(x) := Cuti−1
(
RDi−1(x),Evali−1
(
RDi−2(x),RDi−1(x)
))
for i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , n} (1)
In particular, RDn(x) denotes the value of the last cut point xn obtained by initializing the ripple
effect with x1 = x. Also, note that RDn(0) = 0 and RDn(1) = 1; by convention, the response to
a cut query Cuti(ℓ, τ) is truncated to 1 iff τ is greater than the entire value to the right of ℓ, i.e., if
vi(ℓ, 1) < τ .
Since RDis can be expressed as a composition of the cut and eval queries, these functions can
be efficiently computed in the Robertson-Webb query model. Moreover, using the fact that the cut
and eval queries are λ-Lipschitz, in the following proposition we establish that RDn is also Lipschitz
continuous.
Proposition 1. If in a cake-division instance C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 the cut and eval queries are λ-Lipschitz, then
the function RDn is λ
2(n−1)-Lipschitz.
The proof of Proposition 1 is deferred to Appendix B. The Lipschitz continuity ofRDn turns out to
be a key property, both for establishing the existence of ripple divisions and in developing an efficient
algorithm for finding them. Specifically, we can apply the intermediate value theorem to RDn and
prove that, for any δ > 0, there exists a δ-ripple division; see Lemma 2 below. The universal existence
of δ-ripple divisions, for all δ > 0, along with a limit argument (δ → 0), establishes our existential
result (Lemma 3) for ripple divisions, i.e., for 0-ripple divisions.
The Lipschitzness of RDn also ensures that, via binary search, we can find a δ-ripple division
(via a point x1 ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies RDn(x1) ≥ 1 − δ ), in time that is polynomial in log
(
1
δ
)
. This
runtime dependence ensues that the precision parameter δ can be driven exponentially close to zero,
in polynomial (in the bit complexity of δ) time; see Lemma 4.
5.1 Existence of Ripple Divisions
Lemma 2. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 be a cake-division instance, with λ-Lipschitz cut and eval queries, and let
parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). Then, in C, there always exist a point x̂ ∈ (0, 1) with the property that RDn (x̂) = 1− δ.
Furthermore, such a point x̂ initializes a δ-ripple division: the points x0 = 0, x1 = x̂, and xi = RDi (x̂),
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, form a δ-ripple division in C. Here, the functions RD2, . . . ,RDn are defined with respect to the
cut and eval queries of C.
Proof The function RDn is continuous (Proposition 1) and it satisfies RDn(0) = 0 along with
RDn(1) = 1. Hence, the intermediate value theorem ensures that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), there must
11The first cut point x is specified upfront and, hence, we do not require RD1. The functions RDis are defined for
i ∈ {2, . . . , n}.
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exist a point x̂ ∈ (0, 1) which satisfies RDn (x̂) = 1 − δ. This shows that the required point x̂ always
exists.
We will complete the proof by establishing that the points x0 = 0, x1 = x̂, and xi = RDi (x̂), for
2 ≤ i ≤ n, form a δ-ripple division. Note that, since δ > 0, we have RDn (x̂) < 1. This strict inequality
implies that the intermediate points xis were not truncated to one. Indeed, in this case, all of the value
equalities in Definition 2 hold, i.e., vi(xi−1, xi) = vi(xi, xi+1) for all i ∈ [n− 1]. It remains to show that
these values are positive.
The bound δ < 1 gives us RDn (x̂) > 0 = RDn(0). Therefore, we have x̂ > 0, i.e., x1 = x̂ > 0 = x0.
In the current setting, all nonempty intervals have positive value for the agents. This follows from the
Lipschitz continuity of the cut queries.12 Since the interval [0, x1] is nonempty, agent 1 has a positive
value for it, v1(0, x1) > 0. Furthermore, the value equality v1(x1, x2) = v1(0, x1) gives us v1(x1, x2) >
0, i.e., x2 > x1. Extending this argument iteratively shows that x0 < x1 < . . . < xn < 1. In other
words, each agent receives a positive value under the cut points, i.e., vi(xi−1, xi) = vi(xi, xi+1) > 0
for all i ∈ [n− 1]. Hence, xis form a δ-ripple division. ⊓⊔
Next we use Lemma 2 and a limit argument (δ → 0) to establish universal existence of ripple
divisions.
Lemma 3. Let C be a cake-division instance in which the cut and eval queries are λ-Lipschitz. Then, C
necessarily admits a ripple division.
Proof Lemma 2 asserts that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a collection of points xδ0 = 0 < x
δ
1 < . . . <
xδn−1 < x
δ
n = 1− δ that form a δ-ripple division. Note that here x
δ
n = 1− δ. We consider the sequence
of these δ-ripple divisions, S :=
〈
(xδ0, x
δ
1, . . . , x
δ
n)
〉
δ∈(0,1).
Since S is a nonempty and bounded sequence in [0, 1]n, the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem en-
sures that S contains a convergent subsequence, say
〈
(x
δj
0 , x
δj
1 , . . . , x
δj
n )
〉
δj>0
. Write (x∗0, x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n) ∈
[0, 1]n to denote the limit of this subsequence as δj tends to zero. We will show that the points
x∗0, x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
n form a ripple division in C (see Definition 1), i.e., establish that x
∗
n = 1 and vi(x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ) =
vi(x
∗
i , x
∗
i+1) > 0 for all agents i ∈ [n− 1].
First, note that x∗n = 1, since the sequence 〈1 − δj〉 → 1 as δj → 0. Also, x∗0 = 0, since the constant
sequence 〈0〉 tends to 0.
Wewill next prove that vi(x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ) = vi(x
∗
i , x
∗
i+1) for all agents i ∈ [n−1]. Given that the collection(
xδ0, x
δ
1, . . . , x
δj
n
)
forms a δj-ripple division, we have vi(x
δj
i−1, x
δj
i ) = vi(x
δj
i , x
δj
i+1), for all i ∈ [n− 1].
Recall that the value-density function vi (equivalently, Evali) is Lipschitz continuous over [0, 1]
2.
Therefore, the sequential criterion of continuity13 gives us 〈vi(x
δj
i−1, x
δj
i )〉 → vi(x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ) and 〈vi(x
δj
i , x
δj
i+1)〉 →
vi(x
∗
i , x
∗
i+1), as δj tends to 0. Applying the algebra of limits
14 on the two sequences 〈vi(x
δj
i−1, x
δj
i )〉 and
〈vi(x
δj
i , x
δj
i+1)〉, we obtain that their limits must be equal as well, i.e., vi(x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ) = vi(x
∗
i , x
∗
i+1).
We now complete the proof by showing that these two equal valuesmust be positive, vi(x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ) =
vi(x
∗
i , x
∗
i+1) > 0. Since x
∗
n = 1, we have x
∗
1 > 0; otherwise, if x
∗
1 = 0, then following the value equal-
ities we would have x∗n = RDn(0) = 0. In the current setting, all nonempty intervals have positive
value for the agents. This follows from the Lipschitz continuity of the cut queries. Hence, x∗1 > x
∗
0 = 0
gives us 0 < v1(x
∗
0, x
∗
1) = v1(x
∗
1, x
∗
2). This bound also implies x
∗
2 > x
∗
1. Extending this argument itera-
tively shows that 0 = x∗0 < x
∗
1 < . . . < x
∗
n = 1. Hence, the agents’ values are positive, vi(x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i ) > 0.
Overall, we get that the set of points 0 = x∗0 < x
∗
1 < · · · < x
∗
n = 1 form a ripple division in C. ⊓⊔
12In fact, under MLRP, we explicitly have fi(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1].
13For any continuous function g : [0, 1]2 7→ R, if a sequence 〈at〉t ∈ [0, 1]
2 converges to some a ∈ [0, 1]2, then the sequence
〈g(at)〉t must converge to g(a).
14For any two convergent sequences 〈at〉t → a and 〈bt〉t → b, if we have at = bt for all t ≥ 1, then their limits must be
equal as well, i.e., a = b.
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5.2 Computation of Ripple Divisions
In this section we present an efficient algorithm for computing δ-ripple divisions. Lemma 2 implies
that the problem of computing a δ-ripple division reduces to finding a point x ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
RDn(x) ∈ [1 − δ, 1). The algorithm BINSEARCH (Algorithm 1) finds such a point x (and, hence, a
δ-ripple division) via binary search. It is well-known that binary search can be used to compute fixed
points in the one-dimensional setting. We provide the relevant details here for completeness.
Specifically, in BINSEARCH, we initialize ℓ = 0 along with r = 1 and keep bisecting the interval
[ℓ, r] as long as RDn(ℓ) < 1− δ and RDn(r) = 1. Recall that RDn(0) = 0 and RDn(1) = 1.
Since RDn is Lipschitz continuous (Proposition 1), the intermediate value theorem (applied on
[ℓ, r] with the bounds RDn(ℓ) < 1 − δ and RDn(r) = 1) guarantees that in each considered interval
[ℓ, r] there exists a point x ∈ (ℓ, r)which satisfiesRDn(x) = 1− δ.
15 In each iteration of this algorithm
the length of the considered interval [ℓ, r] reduces by a multiplicative factor of two and, hence, after
an appropriate number of iterations, the required point x and the midpoint of the interval (ℓ + r)/2
get sufficiently close. In such a case, one can show (using the Lipschitz continuity of RDn) that the
midpoint (ℓ+r)/2 itself initializes a 2δ-ripple division. Appendix B.2 formalizes this runtime analysis
and provides a proof of the following lemma.
Algorithm 1 BINSEARCH
Input: A cake-division instance C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉, in the Robertson-Webb query model, and parameter δ > 0.
Output: A δ-ripple division 0 = x0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2, . . . ≤ xn ≤ 1.
1: Initialize ℓ = 0 and r = 1
2: while ℓ < r do
3: if RDn
(
ℓ+r
2
)
< 1− δ then
4: Update ℓ← (ℓ+ r)/2
5: else if RDn
(
ℓ+r
2
)
= 1 then
6: Update r ← (ℓ+ r)/2
7: else if RDn
(
ℓ+r
2
)
∈ [1− δ, 1) then
8: Set x0 = 0, x1 =
ℓ+r
2
, and xi = RDi(x1) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}
9: return the collection of points x0, x1, . . . , xn
10: end if
11: end while
Lemma 4. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 be a cake-division instance in which the cut and eval queries are λ-Lipschitz.
Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 1) and in the Robertson-Webb query model, a δ-ripple division of C can be computed in
O
(
poly(n, log λ, log 1δ )
)
time.
5.3 From Ripple Divisions to Envy-Free Allocations
The next theorem establishes the crucial connection between ripple divisions and envy-freeness. In
particular, setting δ = 0 in this theorem, we obtain that, under MLRP, every (exact) ripple division
induces an envy-free allocation.
Theorem 6. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value densities satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio property and let parameter δ ≥ 0. Then, every δ-ripple division, x0 = 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn−1 ≤
xn ≤ 1, in C induces an envy-free partial allocation {Ii = [xi−1, xi]}ni=1.
15Note that this argument (in particular, the use of intermediate value theorem) does not require RDn to be monotonic.
Also, recall that RDis can be computed efficiently in the Robertson-Webb query model. Hence, evaluating RDis in BIN-
SEARCH leads to at most a polynomial overhead in its runtime.
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This theorem asserts that here the partial allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} (with Ii = [xi−1, xi]) satisfies
vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ij), for all i, j ∈ [n], and at most a δ-length piece of the cake (specifically, [xn, 1]) remains
unallocated in I .
Proof We will show that if the points x0 = 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xn ≤ 1 form a δ-ripple division,
then the partial allocation {Ii = [xi−1, xi]}ni=1 is envy-free. Here, the definition of a δ-ripple division
(Definition 2) ensures that, for each agent i ∈ [n− 1], the values the two consecutive intervals Ii and
Ii+1 are equal and positive
vi(Ii) = vi(xi−1, xi) = vi(xi, xi+1) = vi(Ii+1) > 0 (2)
Recall that the agents are indexed following the MLRP order, i.e., for each i ∈ [n − 1], the likeli-
hood ratio fi+1/fi is nondecreasing. We fix an agent i ∈ [n] and establish envy-freeness with respect
to i by considering two complementary cases (i) for agents to the left of i, we prove that vi(I1) ≤
vi(I2) ≤ . . . ≤ vi(Ii) and (ii) for agents to the right of i, we prove that vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ii+1) ≥ . . . ≥ vi(In).
Case (i): Consider any agent k ∈ [n] such that k < i. Given that fk and fi bear MLRP (i.e., fi/fk
is non-decreasing), property (ii) of Lemma 1, with a = xk−1, b = c = xk, and d = xk+1, gives us
vi(xk−1,xk)
vk(xk−1,xk)
≤
vi(xk,xk+1)
vk(xk,xk+1)
. That is, for the intervals Ik = [xk−1, xk] and Ik+1 = [xk, xk+1] we have
vi(Ik)
vk(Ik)
≤
vi(Ik+1)
vk(Ik+1)
(3)
Instantiating equation (2) for agent k, we can simplify inequality (3) to vi(Ik) ≤ vi(Ik+1). Combining
this inequality across all k < i, we obtain the desired chain of inequalities for agent i, i.e., vi(I1) ≤
vi(I2) ≤ . . . ≤ vi(Ii).
Case (ii): Consider any agent j ∈ [n] such that j > i Given that fi and fj bear MLRP (i.e., fj/fi
is non-decreasing), property (ii) of Lemma 1, with a = xj−1, b = c = xj , and d = xj+1, gives us
vj(xj−1,xj)
vi(xj−1,xj)
≤
vj(xj ,xj+1)
vi(xj ,xj+1)
. That is, for the intervals Ij = [xj−1, xj ] and Ij+1 = [xj , xj+1] we have
vj(Ij)
vi(Ij)
≤
vj(Ij+1)
vi(Ij+1)
(4)
Instantiating equation (2) for agent j, we can simplify inequality (4) to vi(Ij) ≥ vi(Ij+1). Combining
this inequality across all j > i, we obtain the desired chain of inequalities for agent i, i.e., vi(Ii) ≥
vi(Ii+1) ≥ . . . ≥ vi(In).
The above two cases establish that agent i ∈ [n] does not envy any other other agent, i.e., I =
{I1, . . . , In} is an envy-free partial allocation. Indeed, if δ = 0, then I covers the entire cake, i.e., we
obtain an envy-free allocation. ⊓⊔
Notably, Lemma 3 and Theorem 6 (with δ = 0) provide a stand-alone proof of existence of envy-
free allocations in cake-division instances with MLRP. The next section establishes an algorithmic
counterpart of this existential result; specifically, we show that using Lemma 4 one can directly obtain
an efficient algorithm for finding envy-free allocations, under MLRP.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 1
This section restates and proves our main result (Theorem 1) for envy-freeness.
Theorem 1. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an envy-free allocation of
C can be computed (up to an arbitrary precision) in O (poly(n, log λ)) time; here λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz
constant of the cut and eval queries.
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Proof Given a cake-division instance C, with MLRP, and precision parameter η > 0, we invoke
Lemma 4 to find an
( η
λ
)
-ripple division in O
(
poly(n, log λ, log 1η )
)
time.
Write x0 = 0 ≤ x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xn−1 ≤ xn ≤ 1 to denote the computed
( η
λ
)
-ripple division and let
I = {I1, . . . , In} be the corresponding partial allocation; here Ii = [xi−1, xi]. Theorem 6 ensures that
I is envy-free.
We will show that coalescing the unassigned (in I) piece [xn, 1] to agent n provides a complete
allocation that satisfies envy-freeness, up to η precision. Write I∗ := {I∗1 , I
∗
2 , . . . , I
∗
n−1, I
∗
n} to denote
this allocation in which the nth agent receives the interval I∗n := [xn−1, 1] (equivalently, I∗n = In ∪
[xn, 1]) and I
∗
i = Ii for the remaining agents i ∈ [n− 1].
Note that against all agents j ∈ [n− 1], envy-freeness of I∗ directly follows from the fact that the
partial allocation I is envy-free: vi(I
∗
i ) ≥ vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ij) = vi(I
∗
j ), for all i ∈ [n] and all j ∈ [n− 1].
Finally, we address envy against agent n. Recall that xis form a
( η
λ
)
-ripple division, hence xn ≥
1 − ηλ . In addition, the fact that eval queries are λ-Lipschitz gives us vi([xn, 1]) ≤ η for all agents
i ∈ [n]. Hence, for all i ∈ [n] we have
vi(I
∗
i ) ≥ vi(Ii) ≥ vi(In) (since I is an envy-free partial allocation)
= vi(I
∗
n)− vi([xn, 1]) (since I
∗
n = In ∪ [xn, 1])
≥ vi(I
∗
n)− η
Therefore, I∗ satisfies envy-freeness, up to η precision: vi(I∗i ) ≥ vi(I
∗
j )− η for all i, j ∈ [n].
The time complexity obtained via Lemma 4 implies that the parameter η can be driven exponen-
tially close to zero, in time that is polynomial in log 1η (i.e., in the bit complexity of η). Hence, we
can find an envy-free allocation, up to arbitrary precision, in O (poly(n, log λ)) time. Theorem 1 now
stands proved. ⊓⊔
6 Pareto Optimality
This section shows that, withMLRP in hand, one does not loose out on Pareto optimality by imposing
the contiguity requirement. That is, under MLRP, there always exist allocations (i.e., cake divisions
with connected pieces) that are Pareto optimal among all cake divisions, with or without connected
pieces. Moreover, such allocations conform to the MLRP order.
This structural result implies that for maximizing welfare we can restrict attention to allocations
wherein the intervals are assigned (left to right on the cake) in accordance with the MLRP order.
Intuitively, this leads us to a welfare-maximizing algorithm—specifically, a dynamic program—that
recursively finds optimal allocations for intervals placed at the left end of the cake (i.e., for intervals
of the form [0, x]); see Section 7 and Appendix 9 for details.
Subsequently, Section 6.1 (Theorem 2) establishes a strong connection between fairness and (Pareto)
efficiency in the MLRP context: if the value densities bear MLRP, then every envy-free allocation is
necessarily Pareto optimal.
Lemma 5. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value densities satisfy the monotone
likelihood ratio property. Then, for every cake division D = {D1, . . . ,Dn} in C there exists an allocation
J = {J1, . . . , Jn} such that vi(Ji) ≥ vi(Di), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Furthermore, every Pareto optimal allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} in C conforms to the MLRP order, i.e., if
fi+1/fi is nondecreasing in [0, 1], then the interval assigned to agent i (i.e., Ii) appears to the left of the interval
assigned to the agent i+ 1 (i.e., Ii+1).
Proof Consider a cake division D = {D1, . . . ,Dn} wherein two consecutive intervals are assigned
violating the MLRP order: say, interval [p, q] is assigned to agent j (i.e., this interval is contained in
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the bundle Dj), the adjacent interval [q, r] is assigned to agent i, and agent i appears before j in the
MLRP order (fj/fi is non-decreasing over [0, 1]).
We will show that in such a case there always exists a point q′ ∈ [p, r] such that vi(p, q′) ≥ vi(q, r)
and vj(q
′, r) ≥ vj(p, q). That is, one can swap the allocation order between i and j (in the interval
[p, q] ∪ [q, r]) without decreasing the agents’ values. Moreover, we note that, if fj/fi is strictly in-
creasing in the interval [p, q] ∪ [q, r], then this update leads to a strict increase in agent i’s or agent j’s
value.
Hence, starting with any cake division D = {D1, . . . ,Dn}, we can repeatedly apply the above-
mentioned resolution towards the MLRP order and obtain an allocation J = {J1, . . . , Jn} with the
desired property, vi(Ji) ≥ vi(Di) for all i ∈ [n].
Note that this resolution process also establishes the second part of the theorem, i.e., it establishes
the claim that every Pareto optimal allocation conforms to the MLRP order.
The remainder of the proof addresses the desired point q′ ∈ [p, r]. In particular, we will identify q′
such that assigning interval [p, q′] to agent i (instead of [q, r]) and assigning [q′, r] to agent j (instead
of [p, q]) leads to an increment in values.
Write βi :=
vi(q,r)
vi(p,r)
to denote the normalized value of agent i under the initial assignment. Define
q′ ∈ [p, r] to be the point that satisfies
vj(p, q
′)
vj(p, r)
= βi (5)
Since the value densities satisfy MLRP, property (iii) of Lemma 1, applied to the interval [p, r] and
q′ ∈ [p, r], gives us vi(q
′,r)
vi(p,r)
≤
vj(q′,r)
vj(p,r)
. Simplifying further we obtain 1−
vj(q′,r)
vj(p,r)
≤ 1− vi(q
′,r)
vi(p,r)
, i.e.,
vj(p, q
′)
vj(p, r)
≤
vi(p, q
′)
vi(p, r)
(6)
Therefore, we obtain a value bound for agent i
vi(p, q
′)
vi(p, r)
≥
vj(p, q
′)
vj(p, r)
= βi =
vi(q, r)
vi(p, r)
(via equations (6), (5) and the definition of βi)
That is, agent i’s value is preserved through the reassignment, vi(p, q
′) ≥ vi(q, r).
For agent j, via property (iii) of Lemma 1, with interval [p, r] and q ∈ [p, r], we have
vj(q, r)
vj(p, r)
≥
vi(q, r)
vi(p, r)
= βi =
vj(p, q
′)
vj(p, r)
(by the defintion of βi and equation (5))
This inequality reduces to 1−
vj(p,q
′)
vj(p,r)
≥ 1−
vj(q,r)
vj(p,r)
. Simplifying we obtain
vj(p,r)−vj(p,q′)
vj(p,r)
≥
vj(p,r)−vj(q,r)
vj(p,r)
.
Therefore, we have the desired inequality vj(q
′, r) ≥ vj(p, q) and the stated claims follow. ⊓⊔
6.1 Extending Weller’s Theorem
Weller’s theorem [Wel85] is a notable result in the cake-cutting literature and it asserts that there
always exists some cake division—though, not necessarily with connected pieces—which is both
envy-free (fair) and Pareto optimal. While this theorem holds in general, it does not guarantee that
envy-freeness and Pareto optimality can be achieved together with allocations. Indeed, there are
cake-division instances wherein none of the of envy-free allocations are Pareto optimal.
We show that, by contrast under MLRP, every envy-free allocation is Pareto optimal, among all
cake divisions (Theorem 2). Therefore, given a cake-division instance with MLRP, the allocation
computed by our algorithm (Algorithm 1) is not only envy-free but also Pareto optimal, up to an
arbitrary precision.
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Theorem 2. Let C be a cake-division instance wherein the value-density functions satisfy the monotone like-
lihood ratio property. Then, every envy-free allocation in C is also Pareto optimal (over the set of all cake
divisions).
Proof Write I = {I1, I2, . . . , In} to denote an envy-free allocation in C; here interval Ii is as-
signed to agent i ∈ [n]. We assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists a cake division
D = {D1, . . . ,Dn} that Pareto dominates I . Lemma 5 implies that in such a case there exists an
allocation J = {J1, . . . , Jn}which also Pareto dominates I . That is, we have vi(Ji) ≥ vi(Di) ≥ vi(Ii),
for all agents i ∈ [n], and there exists some agent k ∈ [n] such that vk(Jk) ≥ vk(Dk) > vk(Ik).
Recall that for an allocation the endpoints of all the constituent intervals are referred to as its cut
points. We break our analysis into the following two cases depending on whether I and J have the
same set of cut points.
Case 1: The cut points of the allocations I and J are identical. In this case, there must exist a
permutation σ : [n] 7→ [n] such that Iσ(i) = Ji for all i ∈ [n]. Since I is envy-free, we have
vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Iσ(i)) = vi(Ji) for all agents i ∈ [n]. However, this contradicts the fact that J Pareto
dominates the allocation I .
Case 2: The cut points of I and J are not identical. Since both the allocations form a partition of
the same cake [0, 1], there must exist some s, t ∈ [n] such that the interval Js is a strict subset of the
interval It, i.e., Js ⊂ It. Envy-freeness of I gives us vs(Is) ≥ vs(It) > vs(Js). The last strict inequality
follows from the fact that the value density fs of agent s has full support over [0, 1] and Js is a strict
subset of It. This bound vs(Is) > vs(Js) contradicts the fact that J Pareto dominates I and completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
7 Social Welfare
This section develops an algorithm for social welfare maximization. Recall that, under MLRP, Pareto
optimal allocations conform to the MLRP order (Lemma 5). Hence, for maximizing social welfare
we can restrict attention to allocations wherein the intervals are assigned (left-to-right on the cake) in
accordance with the MLRP order. This observation, in and of itself, leads to a fully-polynomial time
approximation scheme for the maximizing social welfare: we can partition the cake into poly(n, 1/ε)
contiguous intervals, each of value at most ε, and then solve the problem using a dynamic program.
We show that instead of considering a general partition we can identify a set P—of O(n2) points—
such that the cut points of an optimal allocation are contained in P . This will enable us to execute a
dynamic program focusing only on the points in P and establish Theorem 3.
For value densities fi and fj , write Lij to denote the set of points at which fj is at least as large as
fi; specifically, Lij := {x ∈ [0, 1] : fj(x) ≥ fi(x)}. Since that the densities fi and fj are normalized,
there must exist a point x ∈ [0, 1] such that fj(x) ≥ fi(x); in other words, Lij 6= ∅. Also, observe
that this set is bounded below by 0. Therefore, the greatest lower bound property of R implies that
Lij admits an infimum. We will refer to this infimum as the switching point between the two value
densities, pij := infx∈Lij x.
16 For a cake-division instance C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉, we will write P to denote
the collection of all switching points pijs, with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n (along with 0 and 1), i.e., P := {pi,j ∈
[0, 1] : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} ∪ {0, 1}; we include the endpoints for cake in P for notational convenience.
Also, recall the convention that the agents are indexed following the MLRP order.
The next lemma provides a useful property about the switching points in the MLRP context.
Lemma 6. Let fi and fj be two value-density functions that satisfy MLRP, i.e., fj/fi is non-decreasing over
[0, 1]. Then,
16As noted, pij exists and satisfies pij ∈ [0, 1]. However, since that the value densities fis are not necessarily continuous
(they are only assumed to be Riemann integrable) a point xwith the property that fi(x) = fj(x)might not exist.
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(a) For all y ∈ [0, pi,j), the likelihood ratio satisfies fj(y)/fi(y) < 1.
(b) For all z ∈ (pij , 1], the likelihood ratio satisfies fj(z)/fi(z) ≥ 1.
Here, pij is the switching point between fi and fj .
Proof As observed previously, pij ∈ [0, 1] exists and is unique. We begin by proving part (a) of the
stated claim. Consider any point y ∈ [0, pi,j) and assume, towards a contradiction, that the likelihood
ratio satisfies
fj(y)
fi(y)
≥ 1. This implies that the point y belongs to the set Lij = {x ∈ [0, 1] : fj(x) ≥
fi(x)}. Since y < pij , we get a contradiction to the fact that pij is the infimum of the set Lij .
For proving part (b), consider any point z ∈ (pij , 1]. Assume, towards a contradiction, that at z we
have
fj(z)
fi(z)
< 1. Since the likelihood ratio
fj(x)
fi(x)
is non-decreasing over [0, 1] (by definition of MLRP),
we have
fj(t)
fi(t)
< 1 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ z. That is, there does not exist a point t ∈ [0, z] with the property that
fj(t) ≥ fi(t). Hence, z constitutes a lower bound for the set Lij = {x ∈ [0, 1] : fj(x) ≥ fi(x)}. Since
pij < z, we get a contradiction to the fact that pij is the infimum (greatest lower bound) of the set Lij .
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
The following corollary asserts that, up to an arbitrary precision, each switching point can be
determined efficiently.
Corollary 1. Let fi and fj be two value densities that bear MLRP and let parameter γ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
in the Robertson-Webb model, we can find an interval of length γ that contains the switching point pij in
O (log (1/γ)) time.
Proof Consider intervals of the form Bk =
[
(k − 1)γ2 , k
γ
2
]
for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2γ }, i.e., for analysis, we
discretize the cake [0, 1] evenly into intervals each of length γ/2. Write k∗ to denote the index with
the property that pij ∈ Bk∗ =
[
(k∗ − 1)γ2 , k
∗ γ
2
]
. Part (a) of Lemma 6 implies that vj(Bk) < vi(Bk) for
all k < k∗. Similarly, part (b) of Lemma 6 gives us vj(Bk) ≥ vi(Bk) for all k > k∗.
Therefore, applying binary search, we can, in O (log (1/γ)) iterations, find the smallest index k′ ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 2γ } such that vj(Bk′) < vi(Bk′) and vj(Bk′+1) ≥ vi(Bk′+1). Note that the computed index
k′ satisfies k′ ∈ {k∗ − 1, k∗}: if, for contradiction, we have k′ ≤ k∗ − 2, then it must be the case that
vj(Bk′+1) < vi(Bk′+1). This inequality contradicts the selection criterion of k
′. Also, the inequality
k′ ≥ k∗ + 1 would lead to the contradiction vj(Bk′) ≥ vi(Bk′).
The value comparisons required to execute the binary search can be performed using eval queries.
Hence, in O (log(1/γ)) iterations we can find an interval Bk′ ∪Bk′+1 of length γ that contains pij . ⊓⊔
This corollary implies that we can efficiently compute the set of switching points P = {pi,j ∈
[0, 1] : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}, up to an arbitrary precision. Next, we will establish the usefulness of P .
Lemma 7. Let C be a cake-division instance in which the value densities satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
property. Then, in C, there exists a social welfare maximizing allocation all of whose cut points belong to the
set of switching points P .
Proof Among all allocations that maximize social welfare, consider the ones that conform to the
MLRP order; Lemma 5 ensures that this collection is nonempty. Furthermore, among these optimal
allocations select one S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} that minimizes |{s0 = 0, s1, s2, . . . , sn = 1} \ P |; here sis
denote the cut points of S . That is, S is a social welfare maximizing allocation that uses as many
points from P as possible. We will show that {si}i \ P = ∅ and, hence, the claim follows.
Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists a cut point st of the allocation S that does not
belong to P . Let Si = [s, st] and Sj = [st, s
′] be the two nonempty intervals in S that are separated by
st. Interval Si is to the (immediate) left of Sj and, since the allocations conform to the MLRP order,
we that i < j.
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Given that st /∈ P , we know that st 6= pij ; here pij is the switching point between fi and fj .
We will show that in this case we can always move st towards pij and obtain another social welfare
maximizing allocation that uses more cut points from P than S . This contradicts the choice of S and
establishes the stated claim. Towards this goal, consider two complementary cases
Case (i): st < pij . In this case we can move st to the right without decreasing the social welfare. In
particular, if pij ∈ Si ∪ Sj = [s, s
′], then, instead of Si and Sj , we can assign intervals [s, pij] and
[pij , s
′] to agents i and j, respectively. Since fj(x) < fi(x) for all x ∈ [st, pij] (Lemma 6, part (a)), such
an update increases the social welfare. This contradicts the optimality (with respect to social welfare)
of S . A similar argument holds if pij > s
′. Here, we can assign [s, s′] entirely to agent i (and an
empty set to agent j). For all x ≤ s′ < pij , we have fj(x) < fi(x) (Lemma 6, part (a)). Therefore, the
reassignment increase the social welfare and leads to a contradiction.
Case (ii): st > pij . In this case we can move st to the left (towards pij). If we have pij ∈ Si ∪ Sj , then
assigning intervals [s, pij] and [pij, s
′] to agents agents i and j, respectively, does not decrease the
social welfare (Lemma 6, part (b)). Though, at the same time, it does provide an allocation that uses
more cut points from P and, hence, contradicts the choice of S . On the other hand, if pij < s, then
we can assign the entire interval [s, s′] to agent j. As before, the reassignment does not decrease the
social welfare. However, it does decrease the cardinality of the set difference between the cut points
and P . This contradicts the selection criterion of S .
Hence, the cut points of S satisfy {si}i ⊆ P and the stated claim follows. ⊓⊔
We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an allocation that achieves
the optimal social welfare in C can be computed (up to an arbitrary precision) in O (poly(n, log λ)) time; here
λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz constant of the cut and eval queries.
Proof Given a cake-division instance C with MLRP, write S∗ = {S∗1 , S
∗
2 , . . . , S
∗
n} to denote the allo-
cation identified in Lemma 7; in particular, S∗ is a social welfare maximizing allocation whose cut
points {0 = s∗0, s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n = 1} belong to the set of switching points P .
For a precision parameter η > 0 and for each switching point pij ∈ P , we invoke Corollary 1 to
find p̂ij ∈ [0, 1] with the property that |p̂ij − pij| ≤
η
nλ . Write P̂ to denote the set of these estimates,
P̂ := {p̂ij : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} ∪ {0, 1}.
17 Applying Corollary 1 to each p̂ij , we get that the set P̂ can be
computed in O(poly(n, log λ, log 1η )) time.
Next we will show that there exists an allocation Ŝ whose cut points are contained in P̂ and this
allocation has near-optimal social welfare, SW(Ŝ) ≥ SW(S∗) − η. Specifically, for each cut point
s∗i of S
∗, let ŝi denote its closest point in P̂ , i.e., ŝi := argminp̂∈P̂ |s
∗
i − p̂|; here we break ties, say,
lexicographically. By construction of P̂ we have |s∗i − ŝi| ≤
η
nλ , for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
For the optical allocation S∗ = {S∗1 , . . . , S
∗
n}we have S
∗
i = [s
∗
i−1, s
∗
i ] for all i ∈ [n]. Write allocation
Ŝ := {Ŝ1, Ŝ2, . . . , Ŝn}, where interval Ŝi = [ŝi−1, ŝi] is assigned to agent i ∈ [n]. The cut points of
allocations Ŝ are contained in P̂ . Also, given that S∗ conforms to the MLRP order, so does Ŝ .
Using the bounds |ŝi − s
∗
i | ≤
η
nλ , for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and the fact that eval queries are λ-Lipschitz, we
obtain |vi(Ŝi) − vi(S
∗
i )| ≤
η
n , for all agents i ∈ [n]. Summing over all i ∈ [n], we obtain the desired
social-welfare bound: |
∑
i∈[n] vi(Ŝi)−
∑
i∈[n] vi(S
∗
i )| = |SW(Ŝ)− SW(S
∗)| ≤ η.
17As in the case of P , we include 0 and 1 in P̂ for ease of presentation.
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Therefore, there exists an allocation Ŝ with the properties that (i) Ŝ has near-optimal social wel-
fare, (ii) cut points of Ŝ are contained in P̂ , and (iii) Ŝ conforms to the MLRP order. To complete
the proof of the theorem we will show that, among all allocations that satisfy properties (ii) and (iii),
we can find one that maximizes social welfare. We accomplish this algorithmic result by a simple
dynamic program.
Recall that cardinality of the set P̂ isO(n2) and this set can be computed inO(poly(n, log λ, log 1η ))
time using eval queries. We index the elements of the computed set P̂ = {p̂t}t such that 0 = p̂0 <
p̂1 < . . . < p̂|P̂ | = 1
For each k ∈ [n] and 1 ≤ t ≤ |P̂ |, we writeM(k, t) to denote the maximum social welfare that one
can achieve by allocating the interval [0, p̂t] among the first k agents (in order).
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The following recursive equation forM(k, t) gives us the desired dynamic program
M(k, t) := max
1≤t′≤t
{
M(k − 1, t′) + vk(p̂t′ , p̂t)
}
Here, we initialize M(1, t) := v1(0, p̂t) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ |P̂ |. One can directly show, via induc-
tion, that M(n, |P̂ |) is equal to the optimal social welfare among allocations that satisfy the above-
mentioned properties (ii) and (iii). That is, M(n, |P̂ |) ≥ SW(S∗) − η. Hence, the dynamic program
gives us the desired allocation. For the runtime analysis, note that the dynamic program runs in
O(n2|P̂ |) time and only requires eval queries.
Overall, we can find an allocation with social welfare η close to the optimal in timeO(poly(n, log λ, log 1η )).
Since the precision parameter η can be driven exponentially close to zero, in time that is polynomial
in log 1η (i.e., in the bit complexity of η) the stated claim follows. ⊓⊔
Remark. For cake-division instances with MLRP, Theorem 3 also shows that we can efficiently maximize
social welfare among all cake divisions, and not necessarily among allocations. In particular, let D∗ =
{D∗1 ,D
∗
2, . . . ,D
∗
n} denote a cake division that maximizes social welfare in a given instance. We know that
there exists an allocation J = {J1, . . . , Jn} such that vi(Ji) ≥ vi(Di), for all i ∈ [n] (Theorem 5). Summing
over i we get SW(J) ≥
∑n
i=1 vi(D
∗
i ). Therefore, the allocation computed through Theorem 3 is (near) optimal
among all cake divisions.
8 Egalitarian Welfare
This section presents an algorithm for maximizing egalitarian welfare in cake-division instances with
MLRP (Theorem 4).
Towards this end, we will define a “moving-knife” procedure that leads to the desired algorithm.
Given a target value τ > 0, we consider cut points obtained by iteratively selecting intervals that
are of value τ to agents 1 through n, respectively. That is, the first cut point x1 is chosen to satisfy
v1(0, x1) = τ . Inductively, for i ≥ 2, the cut point xi is selected such that vi(xi−1, xi) = τ . Recall that
the agents are indexed following the MLRP order. To specify these points, we recursively define n
functions,MKi : R+ 7→ [0, 1], for i ∈ [n]:
MK1(τ) := Cut1(0, τ)
MKi(τ) := Cuti(MKi−1(τ), τ)
Here, MKn(τ) denotes the last cut point which we obtain by executing the moving-knife proce-
dure with target value of τ ∈ [0, 1] for every agent. Given thatMKis can be expressed as a composi-
tion of cut queries, these functions can be efficiently computed in the Robertson-Webb query model.
18By convention, the agents are indexed following the MLRP order.
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The following proposition establishes thatMKn is monotonic.
Proposition 2. For any cake-division instance C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 and each i ∈ [n], the functionMKi is mono-
tonically increasing.
Proof Consider two target values τ, τ ′ ∈ R+ such that τ ≤ τ ′. We will show by inducting over i ∈ [n]
thatMKi(τ) ≤ MKi(τ
′). For the base case i = 1, observe that Cut1(0, τ) ≤ Cut1(0, τ ′), since f1(x) ≥ 0
for all x ∈ [0, 1], In other words, we have MK1(τ) ≤ MK1(τ
′). Next, with the induction hypothesis
MKi−1(τ) ≤ MKi−1(τ ′) in hand, we will establishMKi(τ) ≤ MKi(τ ′):
MKi(τ) = Cuti(MKi−1(τ), τ) ≤ Cuti(MKi−1(τ ′), τ) ≤ Cuti(MKi−1(τ ′), τ ′) = MKi(τ ′)
Here, we use the fact that the value densities are nonnegative. This establishes the stated claim. ⊓⊔
We now establish the main result for egalitarian welfare.
Theorem 4. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an allocation that achieves
the optimal egalitarian welfare in C can be computed (up to an arbitrary precision) in O (poly(n, log λ)) time;
here λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz constant of the cut and eval queries.
Proof For the given cake-division instance C, write R∗ = {R∗1, R
∗
2, . . . , R
∗
n} to denote an allocation
that maximizes egalitarian welfare among all allocations in C. Without loss of generality we can
assume thatR∗ is Pareto optimal an conforms to the MLRP order (Lemma 5). Write τ∗ := EW(R∗) =
mini vi(R
∗
i ).
Note thatMKn(0) = 0 andMKn(1) = 1; by convention, Cuti(ℓ, τ) is truncated to 1 iff τ is greater
than the entire value to the right of ℓ, i.e., if vi(ℓ, 1) < τ .
We will say that a target value τ is feasible iff vi(MKi−1(τ),MKi(τ)) = τ for all i ∈ [n]. That is,
executing themoving-knife procedurewith target value τ ensures that each agent receives an interval
[MKi−1(τ),MKi(τ)] of value τ . Otherwise, we say that τ is infeasible. Note that if τ is infeasible, then
for some i ∈ [n] the MKi(τ) gets truncated at one–in such a case, i and subsequent agents j > i do
not receive intervals of value τ . Hence, τ = 0 is a feasible target value, whereas τ = 1 is infeasible.
Note that we can efficiently determine whether a given τ is feasible or not.19
Proposition 2 implies that we have monotonicity with respect to the feasibility of target values.
Specifically, (P): for all τ ≤ τ ′, if τ is infeasible, then so is τ ′. To establish property (P) we note that, for
an infeasible τ , there exists, by definition, an agent i ∈ [n] such that vi(MKi−1(τ),MKi(τ)) < τ . This
happens when Cuti(MKi−1(τ), τ) = MKi(τ) gets truncated to 1. Applying Proposition 2 to agent
i−1, with τ ≤ τ ′, we obtainMKi−1(τ) ≤ MKi−1(τ ′). Therefore, for agent i the value of the remaining
cake [MKi−1(τ ′), 1] is less than τ ′. Once again Cuti(MKi−1(τ ′), τ ′) gets truncated at 1 and we obtain
vi (MKi−1(τ ′),MKi(τ ′)) < τ ′, i.e., τ ′ is infeasible.
With a precision parameter η > 0 in hand, we perform binary search over integer multiples of η,
i.e., over the set {kη}
1/η
k=0. Recall that the values of the agents are normalized and, hence, τ
∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Also, τ = 0 is feasible, while τ = 1 is infeasible.,
This switch in feasibility (between 0 and 1) along with property (P), imply that there exists a
unique index k0 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 1/η} with the property that k0η is feasible and (k0 +1)η is infeasible. We
can identify k0 by O (log(1/η)) iterations of binary search.
The relevant observation here is that τ∗ ∈ [k0η, (k0+1)η]. Indeed, the optimal value τ∗ is feasible:
R∗ = {R∗1, . . . , R
∗
n} conforms to the MLRP order and vi(R
∗
i ) ≥ τ
∗ for all i ∈ [n]. Hence, property (P)
ensures that τ∗ cannot be greater than the infeasible target (k0 + 1)η. Furthermore, the optimality of
τ∗ gives us τ∗ ≥ k0η.
19As mentioned previously, the functionsMKis can be computed efficiently in the Robertson-Webb model.
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For any feasible τ , the moving-knife procedure provides an allocation with egalitarian welfare
at τ . Specifically, for the computed index k0, consider allocation R̂ = {R̂1, R̂2, . . . , R̂n} in which
R̂i = [MKi−1(k0η),MKi(k0η)], for i ∈ [n− 1] and R̂n = [MKn−1(k0η),MKn(k0η)] ∪ [MKn(k0η), 1]. For
notational convince here we setMK0(k0η) = 0. Feasibility of k0η ensures that vi(R̂i) = k0η ≥ τ
∗ − η
for all i ∈ [n]. Therefore, we have EW(R̂) ≥ τ∗ − η.
For the runtime analysis, note that the binary search finds the desired index k0 inO(poly(n, log
1
η ))
time. The dependency on λ stems from the fact that the bit-complexity of the output (i.e., of the
computed cut points) can be O
(
log ηλ
)
.
Overall, these arguments show that we can find an allocation R̂ with egalitarian welfare η close
to the optimal in time O(poly(n, log λ, log 1η )). The precision parameter η can be driven exponentially
close to zero in time that is polynomial in log 1η and, hence, the stated claim follows. ⊓⊔
9 Nash Social Welfare
This section presents an FPTAS for maximizing Nash social welfare in cake-division instances with
MLRP.
Theorem 5. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy
the monotone likelihood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, an allocation with Nash
social welfare at least (1 − ε) times the optimal (Nash social welfare) in C can be computed in time that is
polynomial in 1/ε, log λ, and n; here λ ∈ R+ is the Lipschitz constant of the cut and eval queries.
Proof Given a cake-division instance C with MLRP, write A∗ = {A∗1, A
∗
2, . . . , A
∗
n} to denote an allo-
cation that maximizes the Nash social welfare in C. Arunachaleswaran et al. [ABKR19] have shown
that the bundles in any Nash optimal allocation A∗ = {A∗1, A
∗
2, . . . , A
∗
n} satisfy vi(A
∗
i ) ≥
1
4vi(A
∗
j ) for
all i, j ∈ [n]; this result holds even in the absence of MLRP. For a fixed agent i ∈ [n], we sum the
inequalities vi(A
∗
i ) ≥
1
4vi(A
∗
j ) over all j ∈ [n] to obtain vi(A
∗
i ) ≥
1
4n . Recall that vi(0, 1) = 1 for all
i ∈ [n].
For an approximation parameter ε > 0, we consider points c0 = 0 < c1 < c2 < . . . < cN = 1 such
that vi(ct−1, ct) ≤ ε8n for all t ∈ [N ] and for all agents i ∈ [n]. In particular, we start with c0 = 0 and
iteratively select points ct := mini Cuti
(
ct−1, ε8n
)
, for all t ≥ 1. Note that the following upper bound
holds for total number of selected pointsN ≤ 8n
2
ε .
We round each cut point in the optimal allocation A∗ to its closest point in the collection {ci}Ni=0.
This leads us to another allocation, Â = {Â1, Â2, . . . , Ân}, wherein interval Âi is assigned to agent
i ∈ [n]. By construction, the cut points of Â are contained in the set {ct}
N
t=0. Also, sinceA
∗ conforms to
theMLRP order (Lemma 5), so does Â. Next we show that the Nash social welfare of Â is comparable
to that of A∗. For all i ∈ [n], we have
vi(Âi) ≥ vi(A
∗
i )−
ε
4n
(since vi(ct−1, ct) ≤ ε8n for all t ∈ [N ])
≥ vi(A
∗
i )− εvi(A
∗
i ) (since vi(A
∗
i ) ≥
1
4n )
≥ (1− ε) vi(A
∗
i )
Multiplying the above inequality over i ∈ [n], we obtain NSW(Â) =
(∏n
i=1 vi(Âi)
)1/n
≥ (1 −
ε) (
∏n
i=1 vi(A
∗
i ))
1/n = (1− ε) NSW(A∗).
Therefore, there exists an allocation Â with the properties that (i) Â has Nash social welfare at
least (1 − ε) times the optimal (Nash social welfare), (ii) the cut points of Â are contained in the set
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{ct}t, and (iii) Â conforms to the MLRP order. To complete the proof of the theorem we will show
that, among all the allocations that satisfy (ii) and (iii), we can find (via a dynamic program) one that
maximizes the Nash social welfare.
For t ∈ [N ] and k ∈ [n], we write H(k, t) to denote the optimal Nash product (i.e., the product of
valuations) that one can achieve by allocating the interval [0, ct] among the first k agents (in order).
H(k, t) := max
1≤t′≤t
{H(k − 1, ct′) · vk(ct′ , ct)}
Here, we initialize the dynamic program by setting H(1, t) := v1(0, ct) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ N . One
can show, via induction, that H(n,N) is the optimal Nash product among allocations that satisfy
properties (ii) and (iii). That is, (H(n,N))1/n ≥ (1 − ε) NSW(A∗). Hence, the dynamic program
computes the desired allocation using O(n2N) eval queries.
Therefore, we can find an allocation with Nash social welfare at least (1 − ε) times the optimal
in O (poly (n, 1/ε, log λ)) time; the dependency on log λ stems from the fact that the bit-complexity of
the output (i.e., of the computed cut points) can be O
(
log ελ
)
. Overall, we get that maximizing Nash
social welfare admits an FPTAS under MLRP. ⊓⊔
10 Conclusion and Future Work
The current work studies algorithmic aspects of contiguous cake division under the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property. The scope of this property ensures that the developed algorithms are applicable
in various cake-division settings. We also note that while underMLRP the value densities must have
full support, the developed framework is somewhat robust to this requirement. For example, our
results extend to the class of non-full-support value densities considered in [AFG+17]. In particu-
lar, Alijani et al. [AFG+17] established that a contiguous envy-free cake division can be efficiently
computed if every agent uniformly values a single interval and these intervals satisfy an ordering
property. Appendix E shows that here one can modify the value densities to a small degree and ob-
tain MLRP (with full support). Hence, applying our results, one can efficiently compute an allocation
with arbitrary small envy in the modified instance and, hence, also in the original one. Generalizing
such ideas to address, say, value densities that bear first-order stochastic dominance is an interesting
direction of future work.
Another relevant notion of fairness in the context of cake cutting is that of a perfect division [Alo87].
In such a division D = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn}, each agent i ∈ [n] values every piece at 1/n, i.e., vi(Dj) =
1/n for all i, j ∈ [n]. In contrast to the other solution concepts considered in the present paper, perfect
divisions are not guaranteed to exist under the contiguity requirement; a perfect allocation might
not exist even with MLRP (Appendix F). However, Alon [Alo87] has shown that a perfect division
with n(n − 1) cuts always exists. Perfect cake divisions are particularly useful since they lead to
truthful mechanisms for cake division [MT10; CLPP13]. Hence, developing efficient algorithms to
find (noncontiguous) perfect divisions under MLRP is a relevant thread for future work.
More broadly, it would be interesting to identify tractable classes through MLRP in other compu-
tational social choice contexts, such as discrete fair division and voting.
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A Characterizations and Implications of MLRP
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In this section we restate and prove Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Let fi and fj be two value-density functions. Then, the following properties are equivalent
(i) The likelihood ratios satisfy
fj(b)
fi(b)
≤
fj(c)
fi(c)
for all 0 ≤ b ≤ c ≤ 1.
(ii) The values of the intervals satisfy
b∫
a
fj
b∫
a
fi
≤
d∫
c
fj
d∫
c
fi
for all [a, b], [c, d] ⊆ [0, 1] with b ≤ c.
(iii) The (normalized) values satisfy
b∫
x
fi
b∫
a
fi
≤
b∫
x
fj
b∫
a
fj
for all intervals [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] and all x ∈ [a, b].
That is, the value densities fi and fj bear MLRP iff they satisfy property (ii) or (iii).
Proof First, we will prove that (i) implies (ii). Given MLRP and with b ≤ c, we have
fj(x)
fi(x)
≤
fj(b)
fi(b)
≤
fj(y)
fi(y)
for all x ∈ [a, b] and for all y ∈ [c, d] (7)
Recall that MLRP value densities are, by definition, positively valued, fi(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, equation (7) gives us fj(x) ≤
fj(b)
fi(b)
fi(x) for all x ∈ [a, b]. Integrating we obtain
b∫
a
fj(x)dx ≤
b∫
a
fj(b)
fi(b)
fi(x)dx and, hence,
20
∫ b
a fj(x)dx∫ b
a fi(x)dx
≤
fj(b)
fi(b)
(8)
Starting with equation (7) and integrating over the interval [c, d], we can also establish the follow-
ing equality
fj(b)
fi(b)
≤
∫ d
c fj(x)dx∫ d
c fi(x)dx
(9)
Equations (8) and (9) lead to property (ii):∫ b
a fj(x)dx∫ b
a fi(x)dx
≤
∫ d
c fj(x)dx∫ d
c fi(x)dx
.
For the reverse direction, i.e., (ii) implies (i), consider any two points 0 ≤ s < t ≤ 1 and an
arbitrarily small ε > 0 (with ε < |t − s|/2). Instantiating property (ii) over the disjoint intervals
[s, s+ ε] and [t, t+ ε] gives us
20Recall that the integral of a positive function is positive.
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s+ε∫
s
fj(x)dx
s+ε∫
s
fi(x)dx
≤
t+ε∫
t
fj(x)dx
t+ε∫
t
fi(x)dx
(10)
Dividing all the terms in equation (10) by ε > 0 and taking limits, we obtain
lim
ε→0
1
ε
s+ε∫
s
fj(x)dx
1
ε
s+ε∫
s
fi(x)dx
≤ lim
ε→0
1
ε
t+ε∫
t
fj(x)dx
1
ε
t+ε∫
t
fi(x)dx
.
Since the value densities fis are positive, via the algebra of limits, the previous inequality reduces
to
limε→0 1ε
s+ε∫
s
fj(x)dx
limε→0 1ε
s+ε∫
s
fi(x)dx
≤
limε→0 1ε
t+ε∫
t
fj(x)dx
limε→0 1ε
t+ε∫
t
fi(x)dx
Finally, invoking the fundamental theorem of calculus, we obtain MLRP (i.e., property (i)) for
s ≤ t
fj(s)
fi(s)
≤
fj(t)
fi(t)
.
To establish that property (ii) implies property (iii), we instantiate (ii) over the intervals [a, x] and
[x, b]:
∫ x
a
fj∫ x
a
fi
≤
∫ b
x
fj∫ b
x
fi
. Cross multiplying the terms21 and adding one to both sides of the inequality,
gives us
∫ x
a fj∫ b
x fj
+1 ≤
∫ x
a fi∫ b
x fi
+1. Simplifying further we obtain
∫ x
a fj+
∫ b
x fj∫ b
x fj
≤
∫ x
a fi+
∫ b
x fi∫ b
x fi
. This gives us the
desired bound ∫ b
x fi∫ b
a fi
≤
∫ b
x fj∫ b
a fj
(11)
Finally, we complete the chain of implications by observing that (iii) implies (ii). Cross multiply-
ing the terms in inequality (11) and subtracting one from both sides yield
∫ b
a
fj∫ b
x
fj
− 1 ≤
∫ b
a
fi∫ b
x
fi
− 1. This
inequality simplifies to
∫ x
a fj∫ b
x fj
≤
∫ x
a fi∫ b
x fi
. That is, we obtain property (ii) for intervals [a, x] and [x, b].
Reapplying this bound (with a, x, and b set appropriately) shows that (iii) implies (ii). This completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
21Recall that the value densities are strictly positive.
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A.2 Efficiently Finding the MLRP Order
This section shows that, if in a cake-division instance the underlying value densities bear MLRP, then
we can efficiently find the MLRP order in the Robertson-Webb query model. Specifically, through
eval queries {Evali(1/2, 1)}i∈[n] we find the value that each agent i ∈ [n] has for the piece [1/2, 1] of
the cake, and sort the agents according to the increasing order (with ties broken arbitrarily) of these
values. Lemma 9 shows that this sorting order is in fact the MLRP order of the underlying value
densities.
To prove this claim, we first state a well-known result (in Lemma 8) that MLRP implies first-order
stochastic dominance; we provide a proof here for completeness. Recall that, given two probability
density functions fi and fj over [0, 1], density fj is said to have first-order stochastic dominance over
fi iff
∫ 1
t fj(x)dx ≥
∫ 1
t fi(x)dx, for all t ∈ [0, 1], and there exists at least one t
′ ∈ [0, 1] such that∫ 1
t′ fj(x)dx >
∫ 1
t′ fi(x)dx.
Lemma 8. Let fi and fj be two value-density functions that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property: for
every 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1 we have
fj(x)
fi(x)
≤
fj(y)
fi(y)
. Then, the density fj has first-order stochastic dominance over fi.
Proof Given that fi and fj bear MLRP, we consider property (iii) of Lemma 1, with a = 0, b = 1,
and x = t, for any 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, to obtain
1∫
t
fi ≤
1∫
t
fj . Here, we use the fact that the valuations are
normalized,
∫ 1
0 fi =
∫ 1
0 fj = 1.
Furthermore, since the two densities are distinct, there exists a point t′ ∈ [0, 1] such that
∫ 1
t′ fj is
not equal to
∫ 1
t′ fi. For such a point t
′, a strict inequality must hold,
∫ 1
t′ fj >
∫ 1
t′ fi. ⊓⊔
Note that, since both MLRP and first-order stochastic dominance are transitive properties, the
above lemma directly extends to a collection of probability density functions.
Next we prove that, given a cake-division instance, with the promise that the underlying value
densities satisfy MLRP, one can find the MLRP order efficiently.
Lemma 9. Let C be a cake-division instance in which the value-density functions satisfy the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property. Then, in the Robertson-Webb query model, we can find the MLRP order of C in polynomial
time.
Proof Through eval queries {Evali(1/2, 1)}i∈[n], we find the value that each agent i ∈ [n] has for
the piece [1/2, 1] of the cake, and sort the agents according to the increasing order (with ties broken
arbitrarily) of these values. We will show that that this sorting order, say π : [n] 7→ [n], is in fact
the MLRP order of the underlying value densities. This directly provides an efficient algorithm for
finding the MLRP order.
Consider two agents i, j ∈ [n] such that i appears before j in the MLRP order, i.e., the likelihood
ratio fj(x)/fi(x) is non-decreasing in x ∈ [0, 1]. Below, wewill address the settings in which the value
densities of i and j are distinct. Otherwise, if the value densities are identical, then Evali(1/2, 1) =
Evalj(1/2, 1) and they will be placed appropriately in the sorting order π.
Given that fi and fj are distinct we get, via Lemma 8, that fj has first-order stochastic dominance
over fi. Therefore, agent j’s value for the piece [1/2, 1] is at least as large as agent i’s value for
this piece,
∫ 1
1/2 fj ≥
∫ 1
1/2 fi, i.e., Evalj(1/2, 1) ≥ Evali(1/2, 1). We will show that, under MLRP, this
inequality is in fact strict and, hence, π correctly identifies theMLRP order among each pair of agents
j and i.
The first-order stochastic dominance between fj and fi also ensures that there exists a point t
′ ∈
[0, 1] such that ∫ 1
t′
fj >
∫ 1
t′
fi (12)
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We consider two complementary cases (i) t′ ≤ 1/2 and (ii) t′ > 1/2. In both of these cases we assume,
towards a contradiction, that
∫ 1
1/2 fj =
∫ 1
1/2 fi.
Case (i): t′ ≤ 1/2. Note that in this case equation (12) expands to
∫ 1/2
t′ fj +
∫ 1
1/2 fj >
∫ 1/2
t′ fi +
∫ 1
1/2 fi.
Since,
∫ 1
1/2 fj =
∫ 1
1/2 fi, we have
∫ 1/2
t′ fj >
∫ 1/2
t′ fi.
On the other hand, applying Lemma 1, property (ii), to intervals [t′, 1/2] and [1/2, 1] gives us∫ 1/2
t′
fj∫ 1/2
t′
fi
≤
∫ 1
1/2 fj∫ 1
1/2 fi
= 1. This inequality leads to the desired contradiction,
∫ 1/2
t′ fj ≤
∫ 1/2
t′ fi.
Case (ii): t′ > 1/2. Here, equation (12) and the assumed equality
∫ 1
1/2 fj =
∫ 1
1/2 fi give us
∫ t′
1/2 fj <∫ t′
1/2 fi.
Note that (due to normalization) we have
∫ 1/2
0 fj =
∫ 1/2
0 fi. This equality contradicts an applica-
tion of Lemma 1, property (ii), to the intervals [0, 1/2] and [1/2, t′]∫ 1/2
0 fj∫ 1/2
0 fi
≤
∫ t′
1/2 fj∫ t′
1/2 fi
< 1
Therefore, by sorting the values of the eval queries {Evali(1/2, 1)}i∈[n] , we can efficiently find the
MLRP order. ⊓⊔
A.3 Lipschitzness of Cut and Eval Queries under MLRP
Here, we prove that if the value densities satisfy MLRP, then the cut and eval queries of the cor-
responding cake-division instance are Lipschitz continuous. Recall, that the value densities fis are
assumed to be Riemann integrable and hence, by definition, fis are bounded. Furthermore, as men-
tioned previously, MLRP mandates that the value densities are strictly positive over the cake. There-
fore, for each agent i ∈ [n] and x ∈ [0, 1] we have 0 < L ≤ fi(x) ≤ U for some L,U ∈ R+. Proposi-
tion 3 below shows that we can express the Lipschitz constant λ in terms of these bounding param-
eters, λ ≤ max{1/L,U,U/L}. This establishes the Lipschitz continuity of the cut and eval queries
under MLRP.
Proposition 3. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value densities are positively-
bounded, i.e., there exists L,U ∈ R+ such that 0 < L ≤ fi(x) ≤ U for each agent i ∈ [n] and all x ∈ [0, 1].
Then the cut and eval queries, {Cuti}i and {Evali}i, are λ-Lipschitz with λ ≤ max{1/L,U,U/L}.
Proof Fix an agent i ∈ [n]. First, we will prove that the eval query (function) Evali is U -Lipschitz.
Then, we will prove that Cuti is max{1/L,U/L}-Lipschitz. These two results imply the stated claim.
Recall that Evali : [0, 1] × [0, 1] 7→ R+ is said to be U -Lipschitz iff |Evali(ℓ, r) − Evali(ℓ
′, r′)| ≤
U max{|ℓ− ℓ′|, |r − r′|}. We will establish this inequality component wise.
For a fixed first component ℓ0 ∈ [0, 1], consider the function g(r) := Evali(ℓ0, r) =
∫ r
ℓ0
fi(x)dx for
r ∈ [0, 1]. Since fi is Riemann integrable, via the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have that the
derivative of g(·) is equal fi(·), i.e.,
d
drg(r) = fi(r) for r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that, if a real-valued function
has a bounded derivative, then it is Lipschitz. Hence, the inequality |fi(r)| ≤ U implies that g(r) is
U -Lipschitz. Therefore, Evali(ℓ, r) is U -Lipschitz in the second argument r.
Similarly, considering the function ĝ(ℓ) := Evali(ℓ, r0), with a fixed r0 ∈ [0, 1], we get that derivate
of ĝ(ℓ) is equal to −fi(ℓ). Hence, Evali(ℓ, r) is U -Lipschitz in the first argument ℓ as well. The two
parts imply that Evali is U -Lipschitz.
For Cuti(ℓ, τ) we again establish Lipschitz continuity by considering the two arguments ℓ and
τ separately. Fix ℓ0 ∈ [0, 1] and for target values τ ≤ τ
′, let y := Cuti(ℓ0, τ) and y′ := Cuti(ℓ0, τ ′).
29
Note that y ≤ y′ and τ ′ − τ is equal to agent i’s value for the interval [y, y′]. This value can be lower
bounded by observing that fi(x) ≥ L, for all x ∈ [0, 1]; specifically, agent i’s value for the interval
[y, y′] is at least L(y′ − y). Therefore, we get that Cuti(ℓ0, τ ′)− Cuti(ℓ0, τ) = y′ − y ≤ 1L(τ
′ − τ). That
is, Cuti(ℓ, τ) is
1
L -Lipschitz in τ ∈ R+.
For the remaining analysis, fix target value τ0 ∈ R+, and for ℓ ≤ ℓ
′, let y := Cuti(ℓ, τ0) and
y′ := Cuti(ℓ′, τ0). A useful observation here is that agent i’s value for the interval [y, y′] is equal to i’s
value for the interval [ℓ, ℓ′], i.e., vi(y, y′) = vi(ℓ, ℓ′).
Specifically, if y ≤ ℓ′, then we can write δ to denote agent i’s value for the interval [y, ℓ′] (i.e., δ :=
vi(y, ℓ
′)) and note that vi(ℓ, ℓ′) = vi(ℓ, y) + vi(y, ℓ′) = τ0+ δ. The equality then follows from observing
that vi(y, y
′) = vi(y, ℓ′)+ vi(ℓ′, y′) = δ+ τ0. Complementarily, if y > ℓ′, then we write δ := vi(ℓ′, y) and
use the following equations to obtain the desired equality: vi(ℓ, ℓ
′) = vi(ℓ, y) − vi(ℓ′, y) = τ0 − δ and
vi(y, y
′) = vi(ℓ′, y′)− vi(ℓ′, y) = τ0 − δ.
The bounds on the value densities, 0 < L ≤ fi(x) ≤ U , and the equality vi(y, y
′) = vi(ℓ, ℓ′) imply
L(y′ − y) ≤ vi(y, y′) = vi(ℓ, ℓ′) ≤ U(ℓ′ − ℓ). Hence, we have |Cuti(ℓ′, τ0) − Cuti(ℓ, τ0)| = |y′ − y| ≤
U
L |ℓ
′ − ℓ|. That is, Cuti(ℓ, τ) is UL -Lipschitz in ℓ ∈ R+.
Combing the above-mentioned bounds we get that the Cuti and Evali queries are λ-Lipschitz
with λ ≤ max{U, 1/L,U/L}. ⊓⊔
B Missing Proofs from Section 5
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Here we restate and prove Proposition 1
Proposition 1. If in a cake-division instance C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 the cut and eval queries are λ-Lipschitz, then
the function RDn is λ
2(n−1)-Lipschitz.
Proof Applying strong induction over i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}, we will prove that the the function RDi is
λ2(i−1)-Lipschitz. For the base case of RD2 consider the following bound, with points x, x′ ∈ [0, 1]:∣∣RD2(x′)− RD2(x)∣∣ = ∣∣Cut1 (x′,Eval1(0, x′)) −Cut1 (x,Eval1(0, x)) ∣∣ (by definition of RD2)
≤ λmax{|x′ − x|, |Eval1(0, x′)− Eval1(0, x)|} (Cut1 is λ-Lipstchiz)
≤ λmax{|x′ − x|, λ|x′ − x|} (Eval1 is λ-Lipstchiz)
= λ2|x′ − x| (since λ ≥ 1)
Hence, RD2 is λ
2-Lipschitz. Next, assuming that, for all k ≤ i − 1, RDk is λ
2(k−1)-Lipschitz, we will
prove that RDi is λ
2(i−1)-Lipschitz. Note that the following bound holds for all x′, x ∈ [0, 1]
Evali−1
(
RDi−2(x′),RDi−1(x′)
)
− Evali−1 (RDi−2(x),RDi−1(x))
≤ λmax{|RDi−2(x′)−RDi−2(x)|, |RDi−1(x′)− RDi−1(x)|} (since Evali−1 is λ-Lipschitz)
≤ λmax{λ2(i−3)|x′ − x|, λ2(i−2)|x′ − x|} (using the induction hypothesis for i− 2 and i− 1)
= λ λ2(i−2)|x− x′| (since λ ≥ 1)
= λ2i−3|x′ − x| (13)
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We can now bound
∣∣RDi(x′)− RDi(x)∣∣ for all x′, x ∈ [0, 1]:∣∣RDi(x′)−RDi(x)∣∣
=
∣∣Cuti−1 (RDi−1(x′),Evali−1 (RDi−2(x′),RDi−1(x′)))− Cuti−1 (RDi−1(x),Evali−1 (RDi−2(x),RDi−1(x))) ∣∣
≤ λmax{|RDi−1(x′)− RDi−1(x)|, λ2i−3|x′ − x|} (since Cuti−1 is λ-Lipstchiz and by equation (13))
≤ λmax{λ2(i−2)|x′ − x|, λ2i−3|x′ − x|} (using the induction hypothesis for i− 1)
= λ2(i−1)|x′ − x| (since λ ≥ 1)
Therefore, RDi is λ
2(i−1)-Lipschitz for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Setting i = n, gives us the desired claim. ⊓⊔
B.2 Proof of Lemma 4
This section restates Lemma 4 and shows that BINSEARCH (Algorithm 1) satisfies this claim.
Lemma 4. Let C = 〈[n], {fi}i〉 be a cake-division instance in which the cut and eval queries are λ-Lipschitz.
Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 1) and in the Robertson-Webb query model, a δ-ripple division of C can be computed in
O
(
poly(n, log λ, log 1δ )
)
time.
Proof Lemma 2 implies that the problem of computing a δ-ripple division reduces to finding a point
x ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies RDn(x) ∈ [1 − δ, 1). Here, we will show that BINSEARCH (Algorithm 1) finds
such a point x (and, hence, a δ-ripple division) in O
(
poly(n, log λ, log 1δ )
)
time.
By design, BINSEARCH maintains two points ℓ ≤ r and keeps iterating till it finds a point x =
(ℓ+ r)/2 that satisfies the required propertyRDn (x) ∈ [1− δ, 1). Hence, at termination the algorithm
indeed finds a δ-ripple division. Below we complete the proof by showing that the time complexity
of the algorithm is as stated (in particular, the algorithm necessarily terminates).
Note that, throughout the algorithm’s execution, the maintained points ℓ and r satisfy RDn(ℓ) <
1 − δ and RDn(r) = 1. This invariant holds at the beginning of the algorithm, where we initialize
ℓ = 0 and r = 1; recall that RDn(0) = 0 and RDn(1) = 1. Furthermore, in each iteration of the
while-loop in BINSEARCH, the left endpoint ℓ gets updated (ℓ← (ℓ+ r)/2) iff the midpoint (ℓ+ r)/2
satisfies RDn
(
ℓ+r
2
)
< 1− δ. That is, even after the update we have RDn(ℓ) < 1− δ. Similarly, for the
right endpoint r, during the algorithm’s execution we have RDn(r) = 1.
This invariant implies that between ℓ and r we always have a point x ∈ (ℓ, r) which satisfies
RDn(x) = 1 − δ/2. This observation is obtained by applying the intermediate value theorem to
the (continuous) function RDn on the interval [ℓ, r]. Hence, the interval under consideration, [ℓ, r],
continues to contain a required point.
Furthermore, in each iteration of the while-loop of BINSEARCH, the difference between ℓ and r
reduces by a multiplicative factor of two. Hence, after T iterations we must have r − ℓ ≤ 1
2T
. In
particular, the difference between (ℓ + r)/2 and the desired point x ∈ (ℓ, r) is at most 1
2T
, after T
iterations. Therefore, the following bound holds after T iterations∣∣∣∣RDn(x)−RDn(ℓ+ r2
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ λ2(n−1) ∣∣∣∣x− (ℓ+ r2
)∣∣∣∣ (Proposition 1: RDn is λ2(n−1)-Lipschitz)
≤
λ2(n−1)
2T
Note that, if the iteration count T is greater than 2 (n− 1) log
(
2λ
δ
)
, then
∣∣RDn(x)− RDn ( ℓ+r2 )∣∣ < δ/2.
Since RDn(x) = 1− δ/2, we get that RDn
(
ℓ+r
2
)
∈ (1− δ, 1). That is, in at most 2 (n− 1) log
(
2λ
δ
)
itera-
tion BINSEARCH will certainly find a point
(
ℓ+r
2
)
that satisfies the termination criterion RDn
(
ℓ+r
2
)
∈
[1 − δ, 1). This shows the time complexity of BINSEARCH is O
(
poly(n, log λ, log 1δ )
)
and completes
the proof. ⊓⊔
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C Distribution Families with MLRP
This section highlights that various well-studied distribution families bear MLRP. Recall, that two
probability density functions fi and fj are said to satisfy MLRP iff, for every x ≤ y in the domain, we
have
fj(x)
fi(x)
≤
fj(y)
fi(y)
.
That is, the likelihood ratio fj(x)/fi(x) is non-decreasing in the argument x ∈ R. It is relevant to note
that this property can be verified analytically. We support this observation through two examples:
Binomial polynomials (and, hence, linear value densities) in Proposition 4 and Gaussian densities
in Proposition 5. Similar analytic arguments can be used to show that many other classes of value
densities satisfy MLRP [LM+01; CB02; SW14].
Binomial Polynomials: The following proposition shows that every pair of binomial polynomials
bear MLRP over [0, 1], i.e., we have a total order over this family of density functions with respect to
MLRP.22 Hence, the results developed in the work hold for cake-division instances in which the value
densities are binomial. Also, setting the exponent parameters s = 1 and t = 0 in this proposition, we
observe that linear functions form a special case of binomial polynomials.
Proposition 4. With integer exponents s > t, let fi(x) = aix
s + bix
t and fj(x) = ajx
s + bjx
t be two
binomial polynomials. Then, fi and fj bear MLRP iff aibj − ajbi ≤ 0.
Proof For any two points x, y ∈ [0, 1], such that x ≤ y, theMLRP condition for binomials corresponds
to the following inequality
ajx
s + bjx
t
aixs + bixt
≤
ajy
s + bjy
t
aiys + biyt
Since fi and fj constitute value densities with full support, the values of these functions are posi-
tive over the cake. Hence, the previous equation can be rewritten as
(ajx
s + bjx
t)(aiy
s + biy
t) ≤ (ajy
s + bjy
t)(aix
s + bix
t)
This equation further simplifies to
(aibj − ajbi)x
tys ≤ (aibj − ajbi)x
syt
Finally, we rewrite the last inequality to obtain that for binomials MLRP is equivalent to
xtyt(aibj − ajbi)(y
s−t − xs−t) ≤ 0 (14)
Since y − x ≥ 0 and (s − t) ∈ Z+, we have that
23 ys−t − xs−t ≥ 0. Furthermore, since xtyt ≥ 0,
inequality (14) holds iff aibj − ajbi ≤ 0. That is, fi and fj bear MLRP iff aibj − ajbi ≤ 0. ⊓⊔
Gaussian distributions: The next proposition shows that Gaussian distributionswith differentmeans,
but the same variance, bear MLRP.
22As mentioned previously, MLRP is preserved under scaling and, hence, here we do not have to explicitly enforce
normalization.
23For (s−t) ∈ N, write ys−t−xs−t = (y−x)(ys−t−1+ys−t−2x+· · ·+yxs−t−2+xs−t−1). Hence, (y−x) and (ys−t−xs−t)
have the same signs, for 0 ≤ x ≤ y ≤ 1.
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Proposition 5. Let fi and fj be two Gaussian density functions with the same variance σ
2 and means µi ≤ µj ,
respectively. Then, fi and fj satisfy MLRP.
Proof Here, the two density functions are fi(x) =
1
σ
√
2π
e−
(x−µi)
2
2σ2 and fj(x) =
1
σ
√
2π
e−
(x−µj )
2
2σ2 , for
x ∈ R. Note that the likelihood ratio of fj and fi is equal to
e−(x−µj)2/2σ2
e−(x−µi)2/2σ2
= exp
(
1
2σ2
(
(x− µi)
2 − (x− µj)
2
))
Write g(x) := 12σ2
(
(x− µi)
2 − (x− µj)
2
)
and note that the derivate of this function g′(x) = (µj−µi)σ2 ≥
0 if and only if µi ≤ µj . Hence, g is an increasing function in x—and so is exp (g(x))—iff µi ≤ µj .
That is, fi and fj bear MLRP iff µi ≤ µj . ⊓⊔
An analogous result holds for Gaussians with mean zero, but distinct variances.
D Bit Complexity of Cake Division
This section provides a cake-division instance (with MLPR) in which the unique envy-free allocation
has an irrational cut point. Notably the parameters that specify the value densities in this instance are
rational. This example implies that, in general, one cannot expect an efficient algorithm that outputs
an exact envy-free allocation. That is, when considering cake-division algorithms with bounded bit
complexity, a precision loss is inevitable.
We will also show, through the example, that to obtain a nontrivial bound on the envy (between
the agents) the bit complexity of the output has to be Ω(log λ); here λ ≥ 1 is the Lipschitz constant of
the cut and eval queries. Hence, a runtime dependence of log λ is unavoidable as well.
Consider cake division between three agents with identical value densities, f : [0, 1] 7→ R+. Such
an instance trivially satisfies MLRP, since the likelihood ratio of the value densities is equal to 1
throughout the cake. In particular, the density function f is piecewise linear and is defined as follows
f(x) :=

λ
3(λ−1) if 0 ≤ x ≤
(
1− 1λ
)
2λ2
3 x+
(
λ− 2λ
2
3
)
if
(
1− 1λ
)
≤ x ≤ 1
Note that this function can be given as input using only rational parameters. In addition, f is
discontinuous at 1 − 1λ ; recall that our results require the value densities to be integrable, and not
necessarily continuous.
Here, the values of the agents are normalized,
∫ 1
0 f(x)dx = 1. Also, the following bounds hold for
the density: 0 < λ3(λ−1) ≤ f(x) ≤ λ for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, Proposition 3 implies that the cut and
eval queries in this instance are 3λ-Lipschitz. Since in this instance the three agents have identical
value densities (with full support over [0, 1]), there exists a unique envy-free allocation wherein each
agent receives an interval of value exactly equal to 1/3. Write 0 = x∗0 ≤ x
∗
1 ≤ x
∗
2 ≤ x
∗
3 = 1 to denote
the cut points of this (unique) envy-free allocation; in particular, agent i ∈ [3] receives the ith interval
[x∗i−1, x
∗
i ].
First, wewill show that x∗2 is irrational. Note that the interval [0, 1−1/λ] is of value 1/3:
∫ 1− 1
λ
0 f(x)dx =
1
3 . Hence, the first cut point x
∗
1 = 1 −
1
λ . The second cut point x
∗
2 now lies in the interval ([x
∗
1, 1]) of
width 1λ and it must satisfy
∫ x∗2
1− 1
λ
f(x)dx = 13 . Using the definition of f in this range, we get that x
∗
2 is
a solution of the following quadratic equation
λ2(x∗2)
2 + (3λ− 2λ2)x∗2 + (λ
2 − 3λ+ 1) = 0 (15)
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With the constraint x∗2 ∈
(
1− 1λ , 1
)
, equation (15) gives us x∗2 = 1 −
(
3−√5
2
)
1
λ . That is, the cut point
x∗2 is irrational, for λ ∈ Q+.
We next establish a lower bound on the bit complexity of the output. Consider, in the above-
mentioned instance, any allocation I = {I1, I2, I3} wherein the envy between the agents is, say, less
than η = 1/2, i.e., vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ij) − 1/2 for all i, j ∈ [n].
24 For any such allocation I one of the cut
points must lie in [(1− 1/λ) , 1]. Indeed, this interval is of value 2/3 to each agent,
∫ 1
(1−1/λ) f = 2/3.
The bit complexity of such a cut point is Ω(log λ). Hence, in general, the bit complexity of the any
algorithm that finds an allocation (equivalently, outputs cut points) with bounded envy is Ω(log λ).
Welfare-maximizing allocations induced by irrational cuts: One can also construct cake-division
instances (with rational andMLRP value densities) in which the welfare-maximizing allocations have
irrational cut points.
In particular, consider cake division between two agents with identical value densities, f(x) =
x+ 1/2. Here, the (unique) allocation I = {I1, I2} that maximizes egalitarian welfare consists of the
intervals I1 =
[
0,
√
5−1
2
]
and I2 =
[√
5−1
2 , 1
]
. Allocation I is also the (unique) equitable, proportional,
and envy-free allocation in this instance.
In addition, consider a cake-division instance with two agents and the following value densities:
f1(x) = 1 and f2(x) = 3x
2. Note that these densities satisfy MLRP. In this instance, the (unique) social
welfare maximizing allocation S = {S1, S2} is obtained by an irrational cut; specifically, S1 =
[
0, 1√
3
]
and S2 =
[
1√
3
, 1
]
. The cut point 1√
3
is the switching point (as defined in Section 7) between the two
densities f1 and f2.
E Robustness of MLRP
This section shows that our framework extends to the class of non-full-support value densities con-
sidered in [AFG+17]. In particular, Alijani et al. [AFG+17] established that a contiguous envy-free
cake division can be efficiently computed if every agent i ∈ [n] uniformly values a single interval
[ℓi, ri] ⊆ [0, 1] and these intervals satisfy the following ordering propertyOP: for all i, j ∈ [n]we have
ℓi ≤ ℓj iff ri ≤ rj . This ordering property OP ensures that, in particular, any interval [ℓi, ri] is not a
strict subset of [ℓj , rj ] for i, j ∈ [n].
Let K = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 denote a cake-division instance with such value densities and note that,
for each i ∈ [n],
fi(x) :=
{
1
ri−ℓi if x ∈ [ℓi, ri]
0 otherwise
(16)
Write hi := 1/(ri − ℓi). The work of Alijani et al. [AFG
+17] shows that an envy-free allocation of K
can be computed efficiently.
Indeed, the value densities in K do not have full support over the cake. However, we will
show that we can perturb these densities fis (in a structured manner) to obtain an instance K̂ =
〈[n], {f̂i}i∈[n]〉 such that (i) the value densities f̂is in K̂ have full support and bear MLRP (Claim 1)
and (ii) any envy-free allocation in K̂ forms an envy-free allocation, up to a small precision loss, in
the original instance K (Claim 2).
Index the agents such that 0 ≤ ℓ1 ≤ ℓ2 ≤ . . . ≤ ℓn ≤ 1. Property OP ensures that, under
this indexing, the right endpoints ris are also sorted: r1 ≤ r2 . . . ≤ rn. To construct the densities
24Here, the choice of η = 1/2 is essentially for ease of exposition; by scaling down the density in the range [0, (1− 1/λ)],
we can drive η close to one.
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f̂i, for each agent i, we will define counting functions ci : [0, 1] 7→ {0, 1, . . . , i} and di : [0, 1] 7→
{0, 1, 2, . . . , n − i} as follows: ci(x) :=
∑i
k=1 1{ℓk ≤ x} and di(x) :=
∑n
k=i 1{rk ≤ x}, i.e., ci(x) is the
number of left endpoints in {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓi} that appear before x and di(x) is equal to the number of
right endpoints in {ri, ri+1, . . . , rn} that appear before x.
For a sufficiently large parameterH ≥ 1 (which we will set in Claim 2), we define f̂i : [0, 1] 7→ R+
as follows25
f̂i(x) := hi H
(ci(x)−i−di(x)) (17)
In other words, we initialize f̂i(0) = hiH
−i and scale up this density by a multiplicative factor of
H whenever an interval [ℓk, rk] starts, for any agent k ≤ i. Note that ci(x) = i and di(x) = 0 for all
x ∈ [ℓi, ri] and, hence, in this interval f̂i(x) = hi = fi(x). Beyond this range, i.e., for x ≥ ri ≥ ℓi, we
have ci(x) = i. Therefore, once the interval [ℓi, ri] ends, we scale down f̂i by a multiplicative factor
of H , whenever an interval [ℓj , rj ] ends, for any agent j ≥ i. Furthermore, for all x /∈ [ℓi, ri], we have
f̂i(x) ≤ hi/H . Also, as required, f̂is have full support over [0, 1].
Applying Proposition 3, we obtain that the Lipschitz constant of cut and eval queries in K̂ is
λ = Hn max1≤i≤n hi. The next claim shows that the the value densities in K̂ satisfy MLRP.
Claim 1. LetK = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 be a cake-division instance in which the value densities satisfy equation (16)
and the ordering property OP. Then, for parameter H ≥ 1, the value densities f̂is (as defined in equation (17))
satisfy MLRP.
Proof In this constructed instance K̂ = 〈[n], {f̂i}i∈[n]〉 the agents are indexed such that 0 ≤ ℓ1 ≤ ℓ2 ≤
· · · ≤ ℓn ≤ 1 and, by OP, we have r1 ≤ r2 ≤ . . . ≤ rn. Fix any two agents i, j ∈ [n] such that i < j.
The indexing among the agents ensures that ℓi ≤ ℓj and ri ≤ rj .
To prove the stated claim it suffices to show that the likelihood ratio
f̂j(x)
f̂i(x)
is nondecreasing
throughout [0, 1]. We establish the monotonicity of this likelihood ratio by considering three different
ranges in the cake [0, ℓi], [ℓi, rj ], and [rj, 1].
Initially, the likelihood ratio
f̂j(0)
f̂i(0)
=
(
hj
hi
)
1
Hj−i
. For all x ∈ [0, ℓi] whenever the density f̂i(x)
experiences a multiplicative increase so does f̂j(x), by the same factor H . In particular, if ci increases
then so does cj throughout the interval [0, ℓi]: if at a point x ∈ [0, ℓi] the density f̂i is scaled up by
a multiplicative factor H (i.e., ci increases by one), then it must have been the case that an interval
[ℓk, rk], with k ≤ i, starts at ℓk = x. In such a case, by definition, f̂j also increases by a multiplicative
factor H (i.e., cj increases by one as well). Therefore, for all x ∈ [0, ℓi], the likelihood ratio stays
constant at
f̂j(0)
f̂i(0)
.
In the interval [ℓi, rj ], the density fi does not increase, since here ci saturates at i after ℓi and di
increases from zero beyond ri. At the same time, in this interval [ℓi, rj ] the density fj is nondecreasing.
Therefore, the likelihood ratio continues to be monotonic in the interval [ℓi, rj ] as well.
Finally, for x ≥ rj , we note that di and dj increase synchronously. Also, for points x ∈ [rj, 1] we
have cj(x) = j and ci(x) = i. Therefore, in this range the likelihood ratio stays constant at
f̂j(rj)
f̂i(rj)
.
Overall, we obtain the monotonicity of the likelihood ratio and the MLRP guarantee follows. ⊓⊔
Claim 2. Given a cake-division instanceK = 〈[n], {fi}i∈[n]〉 in which the value densities satisfy equation (16)
and the ordering property OP. Let K̂ = 〈[n], {f̂i}i∈[n]〉 be the cake-division instance defined above, with
parameter H := 2η max1≤i≤n hi, and suppose that allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} is envy-free up to an additive
factor of η in K̂ (i.e., vi(Ii) ≥ vi(Ij)− η for all i, j ∈ [n]). Then, allocation I envy-free up to 2η in K.
25The integrals of the value densities f̂is are not normalized to 1, though, as mentioned previously, MLRP is preserved
under scaling and, hence, we do not have to explicitly enforce normalization.
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Proof For agent i ∈ [n], write vi and v̂i to denote the valuation function of agent i under fi and f̂i,
respectively. By construction, the densities fi and f̂i coincide over the interval [ℓi, ri]; in particular,
fi(x) = f̂i(x) = hi for all x ∈ [ℓi, ri]. Hence, for any interval I we have vi(I ∩ [ℓi, ri]) = v̂i(I ∩ [ℓi, ri]).
Furthermore, the construction (equation (17)) of f̂i ensures that v̂i(I \ [ℓi, ri]) ≤
hi
H ≤ η/2. The last
inequality follows from the choice of the parameter H . Note that fi(x) = 0 for all x /∈ [ℓi, ri] and,
hence, vi(I \ [ℓi, ri]) = 0. These bounds imply that, for any agent i ∈ [n], the difference in values of
any interval I is at most η/2:
|v̂i(I)− vi(I)| ≤
η
2
(18)
Hence, an allocation I = {I1, . . . , In} that is envy-free up to an additive factor of η in K̂ (i.e.,
v̂i(Ii) ≥ v̂i(Ij)− η for all i, j ∈ [n]) is envy-free up to 2η in K. Specifically, for any i, j ∈ [n],
vi(Ii) ≥ v̂i(Ii)− η/2 (using inequality (18) with interval Ii)
≥ v̂i(Ij)−
3η
2
(by η-envy-freeness of I)
≥ vi(Ij)− 2η (using inequality (18) with interval Ij)
That is, I is envy-free, up to 2η precision, in K. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Since the constructed instance K̂ satisfies MLRP, we can use Algorithm 1 (Section 5) to efficiently
compute, up to an arbitrary precision, an envy-free allocation I in the instance K̂. The previous claim
ensures that I is an envy-free allocation (up to an arbitrary precision) in the original instance K as
well. This observation highlights the fact that the ideas developed in this work are somewhat robust
and extend to other value-density settings.
F Nonexistence of Contiguous Perfect Divisions under MLRP
A cake division D = {D1,D2, . . . ,Dn} (consisting of connected or disconnected pieces) is said to be
perfect if all the agents agree on the value of every piece, i.e., vi(Dj) = 1/n for all i, j ∈ [n].
Perfect divisions are not guaranteed to exist under the contiguity requirement, i.e., there are cake-
division instances that do not admit perfect allocations. In this section, we will show that the nonex-
istence continues to hold even with MLRP. That is, we will provide a cake-division instance with
MLRP that does not admit a perfect allocation.
Consider a cake-division instance C = 〈[2], {f1, f2}〉 with two agents. For a fixed constant α ∈
(0, 1), we define the value densities of the two agents f1, f2 : [0, 1] 7→ R+ as follows
f1(x) =
{
1 + α if 0 ≤ x ≤ (1− α)
α if (1− α) < x ≤ 1
and f2(x) =
{
1− α if 0 ≤ x ≤ (1− α)
2− α if (1− α) < x ≤ 1
The agents’ values for the cake [0, 1] are normalized,
∫ 1
0 f1(x)dx =
∫ 1
0 f2(x)dx = 1. Also, the
likelihood ratio of f1 and f2 satisfies
f2(x)
f1(x)
=
{
1−α
1+α if 0 ≤ x ≤ (1− α)
2−α
α if (1− α) < x ≤ 1
Since 2−αα >
1−α
1+α , for all α ∈ (0, 1), the likelihood ratio is nondecreasing over [0, 1] and, hence, the
densities bear MLRP.
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We assume, towards a contradiction that there exists a perfect allocation in C. That is, there exists
a point x ∈ [0, 1] such that v1(0, x) = v2(0, x) = 1/2, and v1(x, 1) = v2(x, 1) = 1/2. The fact that the
value of intervals [0, x] and [x, 1] is equal to 1/2 ensures that the point x cannot be 0 or 1. We consider
two complementary and exhaustive cases: Case (i) 0 < x ≤ (1−α) and Case (ii) (1−α) < x ≤ 1. The
analysis is similar in both the cases. Hence, we only address Case (i) and omit the analysis for Case
(ii).
For the first interval [0, x] (with 0 < x ≤ (1−α)), we have v1(0, x) = x(1+α) and v2(0, x) = x(1−α).
However, for any α ∈ (0, 1) and x > 0, the following strict inequality holds: v1(0, x) = x(1 + α) >
x(1− α) = v2(0, x). This leads to a contradiction and proves that C does not admit a perfect division
with connected pieces.
Even though we might not have a perfect allocation, the work of Alon [Alo87] proves that a
perfect division with n(n − 1) cuts always exists. Hence, in the above-mentioned instance C with
2 agents, 2 cuts should suffice to form a perfect division. In particular, we note that the following
division D∗ = {D∗1 ,D
∗
2} is perfect in C; here D
∗
1 =
[
1
2 −
α
2 , 1−
α
2
]
and D∗2 =
[
0, 12 −
α
2
]
∪
[
1− α2 , 1
]
.
Here,
v1(D
∗
2) = (1 + α)
(
1
2
−
α
2
)
+ α
(α
2
)
=
1
2
and
v2(D
∗
2) = (1− α)
(
1
2
−
α
2
)
+ (2− α)
(α
2
)
=
1
2
That is, both the agents value the piece D∗2 at 1/2. Since the valuations are normalized, we addition-
ally have v1(D
∗
1) = v2(D
∗
1) = 1/2. This shows that D
∗ is a perfect division (with disconnected pieces)
in C.
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